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1. Introduction
Bertrand competiton has been a prominent paradigm for the empirical study of differen-
tiated product markets for at least twenty years. Firms engaged in Bertrand competition
maximize profits by choosing prices for portfolios of differentiated products, and Bertrand-
Nash equilibrium prices simultaneously maximize profits for all firms. Models combining
Bertrand competition with the Mixed Logit discrete choice model of consumer demand
have been used to study the automotive industry, electronics, entertainment, and food
products and services; see Dube et al. (2002).
Many applications of Bertrand competition rely on counterfactual experiments: exer-
cises in which hypothetical market conditions are simulated with an estimated model. Such
experiments have been used to study corporate mergers (Nevo, 2000a), novel products and
services (Petrin, 2002; Goolsbee and Petrin, 2004; Beresteanu and Li, 2008), store loca-
tions (Thomadsen, 2005), and regulatory policy changes (Goldberg, 1995, 1998; Beresteanu
and Li, 2008). By definition, simulating market outcomes in counterfactual experiments
requires computing equilibrium prices after changing the values of exogenous variables
such as the number of firms or the products offered. Numerical methods for computing
equilibrium prices have not yet received a thorough treatment in the literature, which cur-
rently focuses on model specification and estimation; see Knittel and Metaxoglou (2008);
Dube et al. (2008); Su and Judd (2008) for recent developments in estimation. Morrow
and Skerlos (2010) fills this gap with a detailed investigation of four approaches for com-
puting Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices in single-period, multi-firm models with Mixed
Logit demand. This working paper provides most of the technical background for that
investigation.
Applying Newton’s method to some form of the first-order or “simultaneous stationarity”
condition is currently the de facto approach for computing equilibrium prices; see, for
example, Nevo (1997, 2000a); Petrin (2002); Smith (2004); Doraszelski and Draganska
(2006); Jacobsen (2006). Newton’s method applied directly to the first-order condition
may converge when started at observed prices if changes in exogenous variables have a
marginal impact on equilibrium prices. However, when the changes to exogenous variables
imply significant changes in product prices Newton’s method applied directly to the first-
order conditions may fail to compute equilibrium prices. Furthermore analyses that do not
have observed prices to use as an initial guess will require methods with greater reliability.
Morrow and Skerlos (2010) demonstrate that solving fixed-point equations equivalent to
the first-order condition for equilibrium is more reliable and efficient than solving the first-
order condition itself. One fixed-point equation equivalent to the first-order conditions
is the BLP-markup equation popularized by Berry et al. (1995). A second fixed-point
equation, here termed the ζ-markup equation, is a novel way to write the same condition on
markups. Both markup equations lead to more robust numerical methods than found with
a simple application of Newton’s method to the first-order condition. Using the fixed-point
expressions in this way can be considered “nonlinearly” or “analytically” pre-conditioning
the first-order condition satisfied by equilibrium prices, a technique well-known in applied
mathematics (Brown and Saad, 1990; Cai and Keyes, 2002).
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The existence of fixed-point equations for equilibrium suggests applying fixed-point it-
eration (Judd, 1998) to compute equilibrium prices, instead of Newton’s method. The
BLP-markup equation does not appear to be well-suited to fixed-point iteration. Example
7 in Morrow and Skerlos (2010) provides a case in which iterating on the BLP-markup
equation is not necessarily locally convergent, while iterating on the ζ-markup equation is
superlinearly locally convergent. Iterating on the ζ-markup equation also eliminates the
need to solve linear systems, required to implement Newton’s method and to iterate on
the BLP-markup equation. This property makes fixed-point steps based on the ζ-markup
equation very inexpensive relative to Newton steps, an essential property to obtaining fast
computations from generally linearly convergent fixed-point iterations.
Besides Newton’s method and fixed-point iteration, few other practical approaches to
the computation of equilibrium prices exist. Variational formulations, widely applied in
economic and engineering problems (Ferris and Pang, 1997), contain many solutions that
need not be equilibria of the original problem. Explicit least-square minimization or Gauss-
Newton methods can also be implemented, but are computational disadvantages relative to
applications of standard Newton-type methods for nonlinear systems. Some authors apply
tattonement − iterating on a game’s best response correspondence − to compute equilib-
rium in prices or other strategic variables including product mix (Choi et al., 1990), product
characteristics (CBO, 2003; Austin and Dinan, 2005; Bento et al., 2005), and engineering
variables (Michalek et al., 2004). Tattonement, however, has three issues: it requires the
iterative computation of profit-optimal prices (a special case of the problem discussed in
this article), should be inefficient relative to direct methods whenever optimal strategies
are coupled, and lacks the global convergence guarantees of contemporary Newton solvers.
Section 5 reviews these conclusions in more detail.
This article should be viewed as a companion to Morrow and Skerlos (2010); some of
our notation and text may seem out of place without first reviewing that article. In several
places, text from Morrow and Skerlos (2010) is repeated.
2. A Technical Framework
This section describes the mathematical framework employed in Morrow and Skerlos
(2010). Several key assumptions are introduced and summarized in Table 1.
2.1. Mathematical Notation.
2.1.1. Sets. Table 2 lists some important sets and the symbols used for them. N denotes
the natural numbers {1, 2, . . . }, and N(N) denotes the natural numbers up to N , that is,
N(N) = {1, . . . , N}. R denotes the set of real numbers (−∞,∞), [0,∞) denotes the non-
negative real numbers, and [0,∞] denotes the extended non-negative half-line. We denote
the (J−1)-dimensional simplex {(x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ [0, 1]N :
∑N
n=1 xn = 1} by S(N), and the J-
dimensional “pyramid” {(x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ [0, 1]N :
∑N
n=1 xn ≤ 1} by △(J). Hyper-rectangles
in RN , i.e. sets of the form [a1, b1] × · · · × [aN , bN ] for some an, bn ∈ R with an < bn
for all n ∈ N(N), are denoted by [a,b] where a = (a1, . . . , aN ) and b = (b1, . . . , bN ). P
always denotes the non-negative numbers: P = [0,∞). For other sets, we typically use
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Table 1. List of important assumptions used in this section.
Assumption Purpose
2.1 To provide a general form for utility functions
2.2 To ensure profits are bounded and vanish as prices increase without bound
2.3 To ensure the Leibniz Rule holds, validating Eqn. (9)
2.4 To ensure that η is bounded. Implies the coercivity of Fη,Fζ
and the existence of simultaneously stationary prices.
2.5 To ensure that ζ is bounded. Implies the coercivity of Fζ
and the existence of simultaneously stationary prices.
3.1 To ensure that the derivatives of profit vanish as prices increase without bound
3.2 To ensure the coercivity of Fη,Fζ under weaker conditions than
Assumption 2.4.
Table 2. Important sets.
Symbol Description
N = {1, 2, . . . } Natural numbers
R = (−∞,∞) Real numbers
P = [0,∞) Non-negative real numbers
J = {1, . . . , J} Set of product indices
X ⊂ RK Set of product characteristics
T ⊂ RL Set of individual characteristics
calligraphic upper case letters such as “A”. For any set A, |A| denotes its cardinality. For
any B ⊂ A, A \ B denotes the set {b ∈ A : b /∈ B}.
2.1.2. Symbols. Table 3 itemizes specific symbols used in the text.
Bold, un-italicized symbols (e.g., “x”) denote vectors and matrices; typically we reserve
lower case letters to refer to vectors and use upper case letters to refer to matrices; the
vector of choice probabilities “P” is an exception. Throughout we use 1 to denote a vector
of ones of the appropriate size for the context in which it appears. I always denotes the
identity matrix of a size appropriate for the context. For any x ∈ RN , diag(x) denotes the
N ×N diagonal matrix whose diagonal is x. Any vector inequalities between vectors are
to be taken componentwise: for example, x < y means xn < yn for all n.
Random variables are denoted with capital letters “X”, with random vectors being
denoted with bold capital letters (e.g., “Q”). While this overlaps with our notation for
matrices, it should not cause any confusion. P denotes a probability and E denotes an
expectation. ess supµ f denotes the essential supremum of the (measurable) function f
over T , with respect to the measure µ; see, e.g., Bartle (1966).
log always denotes the natural (base e) logarithm. We use the “Big-O” notation O(g) as
follows: If there exists some M < ∞ such that limp→q[f(p)/g(p)] ≤ M , we say f ∈ O(g);
the point q is left implicit.
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Table 3. Summary of important symbols.
Symbol Description Defined in
Products (see Section 2.2)
J ∈ N number of products
K ∈ N number of non-price product characteristics
xj ∈ X non-price characteristics of product j
pj ∈ P price of product j
p ∈ PJ vector of all product prices
Individual Characteristics (see Section 2.2)
θ ∈ T individual characteristics, including observed
demographics and “random coefficients”
µ − − distribution of individual characteristics
Choice Probabilities (see Section 2.2)
uj(θ, pj) ∈ [−∞,∞) utility of product j
ϑ(θ) ∈ [−∞,∞) utility of the outside good
PLj (θ,p) ∈ [0,1] Logit choice probability for product j Eqn. (1)
Pj(p) ∈ [0,1] Mixed Logit choice probability for product j
P(p) ∈ [0, 1]J vector of Mixed Logit choice probabilities for all
products
Firms, Costs, Profits, and Stationarity (see Section 2.4, 2.5)
F ∈ N number of firms
Jf ⊂ J indices of the products offered by firm f
cj ∈ P (fixed) unit cost of product j
c ∈ PJ vector of all (fixed) unit costs
πˆf (p) ∈ R expected profits for firm f Eqn. (2)
(Dkπˆf )(p) ∈ R derivative of firm f ’s profits, with respect to the Eqn. (6)
price of product k
(∇˜πˆ)(p) ∈ RJ Combined Gradient of profits Prop. 2.2, Eqn. (7)
Choice Probability Derivatives (see Sections 2.5, 2.8)
(DkPj)(p) ∈ R derivative of product j’s choice probability
with respect to the price of product k
(D˜P)(p) ∈ RJ×J “intra-firm” Jacobian matrix of the choice Eqn. (8)
probability vector
Λ(p), Γ˜(p) ∈ RJ×J matrices appearing in our decomposition of (D˜P)(p) Eqn. (9),
Fixed-Point Equations (see Sections 2.7, 2.8)
η(p) ∈ RJ the BLP-markup function (Berry et al., 1995) Eqn. (13)
ζ(p) ∈ RJ our ζ-markup function Eqn. (18)
6 W. ROSS MORROW AND STEVEN J. SKERLOS
2.1.3. Differentiation. Our conventions for denoting differentiation follow Munkres (1991).
We use the symbol “D” to denote differentiation using subscripts to invoke additional
specificity. Letting f : RM → RN , (Dmfn)(x) denotes the derivative of the nth component
function with respect to the mth variable and (Df)(x) is the N ×M derivative matrix of f
at x with components ((Df)(x))n,m = (Dmfn)(x). Thus for f : R
M → R, (Df)(x) is a row
vector. If f : RM → R, we define the gradient (∇f)(x) ∈ RM as the transposed derivative:
(∇f)(x) = (Df)(x)⊤.
2.2. Consumers, Products, and Choice Probabilities. A collection of F ∈ N firms
offer a total of J ∈ N products to a population of individuals (or households). Each product
j ∈ J = {1, . . . , J} is defined by a price, pj ∈ P = [0,∞), and a vector of K ∈ N product
“characteristics” xj ∈ X ⊂ RK . Individuals are identified by a vector of characteristics θ
from some set T . These individual characteristics can include both observed demographics
and “random coefficients” (Berry et al., 1995; Nevo, 2000b; Train, 2003) that characterize
unobserved individual-specific heterogeneity with respect to preference for product char-
acteristics. The relative density of individual characteristic vectors in the population is
described by a probability distribution µ over T .
An individual identified by θ ∈ T receives the (random) utility
Uj(θ,xj , pj) = u(θ,xj , pj) + Ej
from purchasing product j ∈ J , and
U0(θ) = ϑ(θ) + E0
for forgoing purchase of any of these products; i.e. “purchasing the outside good.” Indi-
viduals choose the “product” j ∈ {0, . . . , J} with maximum utility. Here u : T ×X ×P →
[−∞,∞) is a systematic utility function, ϑ : T → R is a valuation of the no-purchase option
or “outside good,” and E = {Ej}Jj=0 is a random vector of i.i.d. standard extreme value
variables. Section 2.3 below gives a general specification of utility functions appropriate
for equilibrium pricing. The basic requirements are that u is continuously differentiable
and strictly decreasing in price, and without lower bound as prices increase.
Demand for each product j is characterized by choice probabilities Pj : PJ → [0, 1]
derived from (random) utility maximization. Given the distributional assumption on E ,
the choice probabilities for an individual characterized by θ ∈ T are those of the Logit
model (Train, 2003, Chapter 3):
(1) PLj (θ,p) =
euj(θ,pj)
eϑ(θ) +
∑J
k=1 e
uk(θ,pk)
.
The vector p ∈ PJ denotes the vector of all product prices. Product-specific utility func-
tions uj : T ×P → [−∞,∞) for all j, defined by uj(θ, p) = u(θ,xj , p) for all (θ, p) ∈ T ×P,
are used in Eqn. (1) and in the following sections. The Mixed Logit choice probabilities
Pj(p) =
∫
PLj (θ,p)dµ(θ) follow from integrating over the distribution of individual char-
acteristics (Train, 2003, Chapter 6). The vector of Mixed Logit choice probabilities for all
products is denoted by P(p) ∈ [0, 1]J .
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The examples below review several instances of this choice model. Examples 1 and 2 are
used in Morrow and Skerlos (2010). Example 3 illustrates the type general specifications
used in estimation. Example 4 describes one kind of “simulation” of a Mixed Logit model
(Train, 2003).
Example 1. (Boyd and Mellman, 1980) Take T = P×RK, denoting θ = (α,β) for α ∈ P
and β ∈ RK . Set u(α,β,x, p) = −αp + β⊤x and ϑ(α,β) = −∞ for all (α,β) ∈ P × RK .
µ is defined by specifying that α and β are independently lognormally distributed (with
appropriately chosen signs, means, and variances).
Example 2. (Berry et al., 1995) Take T = P×RK×R, denoting θ = (φ,β, β0) for φ ∈ P,
β ∈ RK , and β0 ∈ R. Set
u(φ,β,x, p) =
{
α log(φ− p) + β⊤x if p < φ
−∞ otherwise and ϑ(φ, β0) = α log φ+ β0
for some fixed coefficient α > 0. φ represents income and is given a lognormal distribution,
while the random coefficients β, β0 are independently normally distributed with some mean
and variance. Note that income (φ) serves as an upper bound on the price an individual
can pay for any product.
Example 3. (Nevo, 2000b) Take T = P ×RD ×RK+2, denoting θ = (φ,d,ν) for φ ∈ P,
d ∈ RD, and ν ∈ RK+2. Again, φ represents income; d ∈ RD represents a vector of D
observed demographic variables (which may include income); ν ∈ RK+2 represents a vector
of K + 2 random coefficients: one for each product characteristic, one for price, and one
for the outside good. Set
u(φ,d,ν ,x, p) = (α+ pi⊤p d+ σ
⊤
p ν)(φ− p) + (β +Πd+Σν)⊤ x
ϑ(φ,d,ν) = (α+ pi⊤p d+ σ
⊤
p ν)φ+ pi
⊤
0 d+ σ
⊤
0 ν
where α ∈ R, β ∈ RK , pip,pi0 ∈ RD, Π ∈ RK×D, σp,σ0 ∈ RK+2, and Σ ∈ RK×(K+2) are
coefficients. The distribution of d is estimated from available data (e.g., Census data) and
ν is assumed to be standard independent multivariate normal. When α+pi⊤p d+σ
⊤
p ν, the
coefficient on price, is positive, an individual prefers higher prices.
Petrin (2002) and Berry et al. (2004) adopt similar specifications that eliminate this
counterintuitive property. Petrin (2002) takes the price component of utility to be α(φ) log(φ−
p), where α : P → P is a step function. Berry et al. (2004) take the price component of
utility to be αp, but define α = −e−(α+pi⊤p d+σ⊤p ν).
Example 4. (Simulation). Take any of the examples above, and draw S ∈ N vectors
θs ∈ T according to the distribution µ. Let T ′ = {θs}Ss=1 and define a probability measure
µ′ over T ′ by µ′(θs) = 1/S for all s. Then (u, ϑ,T ′, µ′) defines a simulator of the “full”
Mixed Logit model with (u, ϑ,T , µ); see Train (2003). These approximations are essential
in estimation of Mixed Logit models and in computations of equilibrium prices.
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2.3. Utility Specification. This section presents a generalization of the systematic utility
functions used in the examples given in the text, a specification closely related to the one
introduced by Caplin and Nalebuff (1991). Morrow (2008); Morrow and Skerlos (2008) use
a similar specification to analyze equilibrium prices in simple Logit models.
Assumption 2.1. For all j, there exist functions wj : T × P → [−∞,∞) and vj :
T → (−∞,∞) such that the systematic utility function uj : T × P → [−∞,∞) can be
written uj(θ, p) = wj(θ, p) + vj(θ). Furthermore there exists ς : T → (0,∞] such that
wj : T × [0,∞]→ [−∞,∞) satisfies, for all j and µ-almost every (a.e.) θ ∈ T ,
(a) wj(θ, ·) : (0, ς(θ)) → [−∞,∞) is continuously differentiable, strictly decreasing,
and finite
(b) wj(θ, p) = −∞ for all p ≥ ς(θ), and
(c) wj(θ, p) ↓ −∞ as p ↑ ς(θ).
vj : T → (−∞,∞) is arbitrary.
Note that we have not restricted µ, the distribution of individual characteristics, with
Assumption 2.1. Important examples of µ from the econometrics and marketing litera-
ture include finitely supported distributions (often empirical frequency distributions for
integral observed demographic variables), standard continuous distributions (e.g. normal,
lognormal and χ2), truncated standard continuous distributions, finite mixtures of standard
continuous distributions, and independent products of any of these types of distributions.
This generality allows us to address a wide variety of otherwise disparate examples with
a single notation. In particular, this generality allows us to use a single framework to
treat both “full” Mixed Logit models defined by some µ with uncountable support and
simulation-based approximations to such models.
Some existing empirical specifications violate Assumption 2.1 by admiting positive price
coefficients for θ ∈ T ′ ⊂ T , where T ′ ⊂ T has nonzero µ-measure. See, for example, Nevo
(2000a) (Example 3) or Brownstone et al. (2000). This implies that w(θ, ·) is increasing
on T ′. If w(θ, ·) is not decreasing for µ-a.e. θ, or at least eventually decreasing for µ-a.e.
θ in the sense that there are always prices large enough to ensure that w(θ, ·) is decreasing
for µ-a.e. θ, then profit-optimal pricing is not a well-posed problem and finite equilibrium
prices will not exist.
The variable Σ = ς(θ) represents an individual-specific reservation price. As in the
Berry et al. (1995) model of Example 2, this reservation price is most often derived from
household or individual income. Correspondingly, Σ is often given a lognormal distribution
to (roughly) fit empirical income data. In principle, this reservation price could be related
to purchasing power derived from observed demographic variables other than income, or
unobserved demographic variables such as family wealth. Thus we allow this reservation
price to be specified as a function of all “demographic” characteristics, θ. Conditions (b)
and (c) in Assumption 2.1 imply that the probability an individual characterized by θ will
purchase a product is zero for any price above ς(θ) and vanishes as the price approaches
ς(θ). We set ς∗ = ess sup ς and allow, but do not require, ς∗ =∞. For example, simulation-
based approximations to the Berry et al. demand model have ς∗ < ∞, as can be easily
checked.
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Note also that Condition (c) in Assumption 2.1 ensures the continuity of PLj (θ,p) at
any vector of prices with some component equal to ς(θ). We must require this of the
Logit choice probabilities to obtain Mixed Logit choice probabilities that are continuous
on (0, ς∗)
J for the important class of simulation-based approximations with finitely sup-
ported µ. Continuous Logit choice probabilities also imply continuous Mixed Logit choice
probabilities, by the Dominated Convergence Theorem.
2.4. Profits. To describe the optimal pricing problems faced by each firm we use the
following notation. Let F ∈ N denote the number of firms. For each f ∈ {1, . . . , F}, there
exists a set Jf ⊂ J of indices that corresponds to the Jf = |Jf | products offered by firm f .
The collection of all these sets, {Jf}Ff=1, forms a partition of J . Subsequently, in writing
“f(j)” for some j ∈ J , we mean the unique f ∈ {1, . . . , F} such that j ∈ Jf . The vector
pf ∈ RJf refers to the vector of prices of the products offered by firm f . Negative subscripts
denote competitor’s variables as in, for instance, p−f ∈ RJ−f , where J−f =
∑
g 6=f Jg, is
the vector of prices for products offered by all of firm f ’s competitors. Firm-specific choice
probability functions are denoted by Pf (p) ∈ RJf .
Two additional assumptions are required to complete the definition of firms’ profits in
a manner consistent with empirical applications of Bertrand competition. First, we must
specify unit and fixed costs: for each product j there exists a unit cost cj ∈ P and for each
firm there exists a fixed cost cFf ∈ P. Both cj and cFf depend only on the collection of
product characteristics chosen by the firm, and not on the quantity sold by the firm during
the purchasing period for the reasons discussed below. We let cf ∈ PJf denote the vector
of unit costs for the products offered by firm f , and c ∈ PJ denote the vector of unit costs
for all products.
Second, Bertrand competition entails the following “comittment” assumption on the
quantities produced (Baye and Kovenock, 2008). Let Qj(p) denote the (random) quantity
of product j that the population will demand during the purchasing period, given prices
for all products p. These random demands are derived from random utility maximization.
We assume each firm commits to producing exactly Qj(p) units of each product j ∈ Jf
during the purchasing period. This implies either that there are no production capacity
constraints that limit a firm’s ability to meet any demands that arise during the purchase
period, or that production backlogs do not affect demand.
With the commitment and constant costs assumptions, the total cost firm f incurs in
producing (and selling) Qj(p) units of product j during the purchasing period are given
by the random variable ∑
j∈Jf
cjQj(p) + c
F
f .
Random revenues are, of course, given by
∑
j∈Jf
Qj(p)pj . The random variable
Πf (p) =
∑
j∈Jf
Qj(p)(pj − cj)− cFf
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then gives firm f ’s (random) profits for the purchasing period as a function of all product
prices. Following most of the theoretical and empirical literature in both marketing and
economics, we assume that firms take expected profits,
(2) E[Πf (p)] = Iπˆf (p)− cFf where πˆf (p) =
∑
j∈Jf
Pj(p)(pj − cj)
as the metric by which they optimize their pricing decisions in this stochastic optimization
problem. Here I ∈ N denotes the number of individuals in the population.
Eqn. (2) demonstrates that neither the total firm fixed costs cFf nor the population
size I play a role in determining the prices that maximize expected profits under the
assumptions described above. Henceforth we focus on the “population-normalized gross
expected profits” πˆf (p), referred to in the text and below as simply “profits”. Firms thus
solve
(3)
maximize πˆf (p) =
∑
j∈Jf
Pj(p)(pj − cj)
with respect to pf ∈ PJf
Before continuing with our framework, we discuss quantity-dependent costs and clarify
when profits are bounded.
2.4.1. Quantity-Dependent Costs. Including costs that depend on quantities produced is
certainly possible, though this should introduce extra terms into the first-order equations
presented below (Eqn. (7)). Generally speaking, unit costs that depend on the quantity
produced would be expressed as cj : Z+ → P, and unit costs that depended on the expected
quantity produced would be expressed as cj : P → P. If unit costs depend on the quantity
produced, then product j’s unit costs for the purchasing period (i) are random and (ii)
depend on prices. To see this, simply note that product j’s unit costs for the purchasing
period are cj(Qj(p)). Assuming quantity-dependent costs also obscures expected profits,
since there are now nonlinear terms Qj(p)cj(Qj(p)) in the formula for random profits.
If unit costs depend only on the expected quantity produced, then unit costs are not
random but still depend on prices: cj(E[Qj(p)]) = cj(IPj(p)). In either case the derivatives
of unit costs with respect to prices should appear in the first-order conditions. This is
acknowledged in the theoretical literature. As these terms have not yet been included in
the empirical literature, even when costs are assumed to depend on quantities produced
(Berry et al., 1995; Petrin, 2002), we focus on costs that are independent of the quantity
produced.
2.4.2. Bounded and Vanishing Profits. Here we present a technical assumption that ensures
that profits are not only bounded, but vanish as all prices approach ς∗.
Assumption 2.2. For all j there exists some rj : T → (1,∞) and some p¯j : T → P
satisfying
(4) sup
{
pµ({θ : p¯(θ) > p}) : p ∈ (0, ς∗)
}
<∞.
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such that
(5) uj(θ, p) ≤ −rj(θ) log p+ ϑ(θ)
for all p ≥ p¯j(θ), µ-a.e.
Lemma 2.1. If Assumption 2.2 holds, then πˆf (p) is bounded in p and vanishes as pf →
ς∗1 ∈ RJf .
Proof. We use the Dominated Convergence Theorem. Eqn. (5) ensures that pjP
L
j (θ,p)
vanishes µ-a.e. as pj ↑ ς∗; see also Morrow and Skerlos (2008). Eqn. (4) ensures that
πˆf (p) =
∑
j∈Jf
∫
pjP
L
j (θ,p)dµ(θ)−
∑
j∈Jf
cj
∫
Pj(p)
is bounded as prices approach ς∗, as we now show.
The key quantities in this integral are∫
pjP
L
j (θ,p)dµ(θ) ≤
∫
pj
(
euj(θ,pj)−ϑ(θ)
1 + euj(θ,pj)−ϑ(θ)
)
dµ(θ);
the cjPj(p) terms vanish if pj ↑ ς∗ since Pj(p) vanishes. We must show that these terms
are bounded as pj ↑ ς∗. By assumption,
pj
(
euj(θ,pj)−ϑ(θ)
1 + euj(θ,pj)−ϑ(θ)
)
≤
(
1
pj
)rj(θ)−1( 1
1 + euj(θ,pj)−ϑ(θ)
)
for all pj ≥ p¯j(θ). Thus we write∫
pj
(
euj(θ,pj)−ϑ(θ)
1 + euj(θ,pj)−ϑ(θ)
)
dµ(θ) =
∫
{θ:pj<p¯j(θ)}
pj
(
euj(θ,pj)−ϑ(θ)
1 + euj(θ,pj)−ϑ(θ)
)
dµ(θ)
+
∫
{θ:pj≥p¯j(θ)}
pj
(
euj(θ,pj)−ϑ(θ)
1 + euj(θ,pj)−ϑ(θ)
)
dµ(θ)
≤ pjµ{θ : pj < p¯j(θ)}
+
∫
{θ:pj≥p¯j(θ)}
(
1
pj
)rj(θ)−1
dµ(θ).
By Eqn. (4), the first term is bounded. We take pj > 1, without loss of generality, so that
1/prj(θ)−1 ≤ 1 for µ-a.e. θ and the second term is bounded. 
We now make some remarks regarding Assumption 2.2.
Note that if ς(θ) < ∞ then Eqn. (5) holds for any r(θ) > 1 by taking p¯(θ) = ς(θ). If
ς(θ) =∞, Eqn. (5) admits any utility function u(θ, ·) that is (eventually) concave in price.
If ς∗ <∞, then ς(θ) <∞ for µ-a.e. θ. Furthermore, Eqn. (4) is trivial.
To further analyze Eqn. (4), we assume ς∗ = ∞. We define Z = p¯(Θ), where Θ is the
T -valued random variable with P(Θ ∈ A) = µ(A) = ∫A dµ(θ). If ς(θ) < ∞ for µ-a.e.
θ, then we can take Z = Σ = ς(Θ). Eqn. (4) can be re-written as sup{pP(Z > p) :
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p ∈ (0,∞)} < ∞, or equivalently limp→∞[pP(Z > p)] < ∞. Eqn. (4) admits any Z
with finite expectation, and even admits any Z with a “fat-tailed” distribution satisfying
p1+βP(Z > p)→ 1 as p→∞ for some β > 0. Eqn. (4) can be written P(Z > p) = O(1/p).
2.5. Local Equilibrium and the Simultaneous Stationarity Conditions. Assuming
that the choice probabilities are continuously differentiable in prices, at equilibrium each
firm’s prices satisfy the stationarity condition
(6) (Dkπˆf )(p) =
∑
j∈Jf
(DkPj)(p)(pj − cj) + Pk(p) for all k ∈ Jf .
Combining the stationarity condition for each firm we obtain the Simultaneous Station-
arity Condition, a first-order (necessary) condition for local equilibrium prices.
Proposition 2.2 (Simultaneous Stationarity Condition). Suppose P is continuously differ-
entiable. Let (∇˜πˆ)(p) ∈ RJ denote the “combined gradient” with components ((∇˜πˆ)(p))j =
(Dj πˆf(j))(p) where f(j) denotes the index of the firm offering product j. If p is a local
equilibrium, then
(7) (∇˜πˆ)(p) = (D˜P)(p)⊤(p− c) +P(p) = 0.
where (D˜P)(p) ∈ RJ×J is the “intra-firm” Jacobian matrix of price derivatives of the
choice probabilities defined by
(8)
(
(D˜P)(p)
)
j,k
=
{
(DkPj)(p) if products j and k are offered by the same firm
0 otherwise
Prices p satisfying Eqn. (7) are called “simultaneously stationary.”
The matrix −(D˜P)(p) has previously been denoted by “△” (Berry et al., 1995; Petrin,
2002; Beresteanu and Li, 2008), “Ω” (Nevo, 2000a), and “Φ” (Dube et al., 2002). We prefer
the “D” notation to emphasize the relationship of (D˜P)(p) to the Jacobian matrix of the
choice probabilities P, while using the superscript “∼” to denote the intra-firm sparsity
structure.
A set of simultaneously stationary prices are a local equilibrium only if every firm’s profits
are locally maximized at those prices; this can be verified by confirming that every firm’s
profits are locally concave (Section ??). Note that there is no convenient condition to verify
that every firm’s profits are globally maximized at a particular local equilibrium. That is,
there is no convenient condition to ensure that certain prices are a proper equilibrium.
2.6. Choice Probability Derivatives. In this section we examine the price derivatives
of Mixed Logit choice probabilities. In what follows, (Dwj)(pj) denotes the derivative of
the price component of utility, wj, with respect to price.
Proposition 2.3. Fix p ∈ (0, ς∗)J , let uj be given as in Assumption 2.1 for all j, and sup-
pose the Leibniz Rule holds for the Mixed Logit choice probabilities Pj(p) =
∫
PLj (θ,p)dµ(θ);
that is, (DkPj)(p) =
∫
(DjP
L
k )(θ,p)dµ(θ). Then the Jacobian matrix of P is given by
(9) (DP)(p) = Λ(p)− Γ(p)
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where Λ(p) ∈ RJ×J is the diagonal matrix with diagonal entries
λj(p) =
∫
L(pj)
(Dwj)(θ, pj)P
L
j (θ,p)dµ(θ), L(p) = {θ : ς(θ) > p}
and Γ(p) is the full J × J matrix with entries
γj,k(p) =
∫
G(pj ,pk)
PLj (θ,p)P
L
k (θ,p)(Dwk)(θ, pk)dµ(θ), G(p, q) = L(p) ∩ L(q).
The intra-firm price derivatives of the Mixed Logit choice probabilities are given by (D˜P)(p) =
Λ(p)− Γ˜(p) where (Γ˜(p))
j,k
= γj,k(p) if f(j) = f(k) and
(
Γ˜(p)
)
j,k
= 0 otherwise.
Proof. We first characterize the Logit choice probabilities. For all j, k we have
(DkP
L
j )(θ,p) = P
L
j (θ,p)(δj,k − PLk (θ,p))(Dwk)(θ, pk)
= δj,kP
L
k (θ,p)(Dwk)(θ, pk)− PLj (θ,p)PLk (θ,p)(Dwk)(θ, pk)
for any θ ∈ L(pk) and (DkPLj )(θ,p) = 0 for any θ ∈ {θ′ ∈ T : pk > ς(θ′)} (because
PLj (θ, ·) is identically zero in a neighborhood of p). Neglecting values θ ∈ ς−1(pk) for
the moment, we observe that these formulae and the Leibniz rule generate the desired
expression for the Mixed Logit choice probabilities.
We complete the proof by considering θ ∈ ς−1(pk). If ς−1(pk) has µ-measure zero for any
pk, then we do not need to worry about Logit choice probability derivatives at θ ∈ ς−1(pk).
On the other hand if ς−1(pk) has positive µ-measure for some pk, we must assume continuity
of the Logit choice probability derivatives: i.e. (DkP
L
j )(θ,p)→ 0 as pk ↑ ς(θ). Otherwise,
the Logit choice probability derivative is not defined on a set of demographics with positive
measure. 
λ is closely related to a familiar economic quantity. Recall that the “inclusive value,”
or expected maximum utility, conditional on demographics is given by (Small and Rosen,
1981; Train, 2003)
ιL(θ,p) = log

eϑ(θ) + J∑
j=1
euj(θ,pj)


It is easy to see that λk is the derivative of the “aggregate inclusive value” ι(p) =∫
ιL(θ,p)dµ(θ) with respect to the kth price: λk(p) = (Dkι)(p) =
∫
(Dkι
L)(θ,p)dµ(θ).
Note that Γ(p) and Γ˜(p) are not necessarily symmetric for all p. If (Dwk)(θ, p) is
independent of both k and p, as in the case of the Boyd and Mellman (1980) model
presented in Example 1 above, then Γ(p) (and thus Γ˜(p)) is symmetric for all p. On the
other hand if (Dwk)(θ, ·) is independent of k and strictly monotone in p, as is the case of
the strictly concave in price utility from Berry et al. (1995), then γj,k(p) = γk,j(p) if and
only if pj = pk.
The following assumption gives a simple, abstract condition on (u, ϑ, µ) that guarantees
the Leibniz Rule holds and defines continuously differentiable choice probabilities.
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Assumption 2.3. Let k be arbitrary and define ψk : T × P → P by
ψk(θ, p) =


|(Dwk)(θ, p)|
(
euk(θ,p)
eϑ(θ) + euk(θ,p)
)
if p < ς(θ)
0 if p ≥ ς(θ)
Assume (i) ψk(θ, ·) : (0, ς∗) → P is continuous for µ-a.e. θ ∈ T ; that is, ψk(θ, q) →
ψk(θ, p) as q → p for any p ∈ (0, ς∗). (ii) ψk(·, p′) : T → P is uniformly µ-integrable for
all p′ in some neighborhood of any p ∈ (0, ς∗); that is, there exists some ϕ : T → [0,∞)
with
∫
ϕ(θ)dµ(θ) <∞ (that may depend on k and p), such that ψk(θ, p′) ≤ ϕ(θ) for all p′
in some neighborhood of p.
Note that under Assumption 2.1, (i) requires only that ψk(θ, p) → 0 as p ↑ ς(θ) for
µ-a.e. θ.
Proposition 2.4. If Assumption 2.3 holds, then the Leibniz Rule holds for the Mixed Logit
choice probabilities which are also continuously differentiable on (0, ς∗)
J .
Proof. Taking for granted that (DkP
L
j )(θ, ·) is continuous at p and the differences
(10) h−1
(
PLj (θ,p+ hek)− PLj (θ,p)
)
are uniformly µ-integrable for small enough h, the Dominated Convergence Theorem im-
plies that
lim
h→0
h−1
(∫
PLj (θ,p+ hek)dµ(θ)−
∫
PLj (θ,p)dµ(θ)
)
= lim
h→0
∫
h−1
(
PLj (θ,p+ hek)− PLj (θ,p)
)
dµ(θ)
=
∫
lim
h→0
h−1
(
PLj (θ,p+ hek)− PLj (θ,p)
)
dµ(θ)
=
∫
(DkP
L
j )(θ,p)dµ(θ).
This validates the Leibniz Rule. This proof is essentially that given in a general setting by
(Bartle, 1966, Chapter 5, pg. 46).
To complete the proof we must validate that (DkP
L
j )(θ, ·) is continuous in pk and the
differences in Eqn. (10) are uniformly µ-integrable in a neighborhood of pk. It is easy to
see that the desired continuity follows from Assumption 2.1 and Assumption 2.3, Condition
(i). Specifically, note that (DkP
L
j )(θ,p) = 0 = ψk(θ, pk) for θ ∈ {θ′ ∈ T : pk > ς(θ′)} and
(DkP
L
j )(θ,p) =
(
δj,k − PLj (θ,p)
)
PLk (θ,p)(Dwk)(θ, pk)
=
(
δj,k − PLj (θ,p)
)( eϑ(θ) + euk(θ,pk)
eϑ(θ) +
∑J
i=1 e
ui(θ,pi)
)(
euk(θ,pk)
eϑ(θ) + euk(θ,pk)
)
(Dwk)(θ, pk)
=
(
δj,k − PLj (θ,p)
)( eϑ(θ) + euk(θ,pk)
eϑ(θ) +
∑J
i=1 e
ui(θ,pi)
)
ψk(θ, pk)
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for θ ∈ L(pk). Suppose pk = ς(θ). By Assumption 2.1 (a) and (b), the first two terms are
continuous. By Assumption 2.1 (c),
lim
q→p,qk<ς(θ)
(DkP
L
j )(θ,p) =
(
δj,k − e
uj(θ,pj)
eϑ(θ) +
∑
i 6=k e
ui(θ,pi)
)(
eϑ(θ)
eϑ(θ) +
∑
i 6=k e
ui(θ,pi)
)
lim
qk↑ς(θ)
ψk(θ, qk)
Assumption 2.3, Condition (i) is then necessary for the continuity of (DkP
L
j )(θ,p) for all
j, k and p ∈ (0, ς∗1). Specifically if ψk(θ, ·) is discontinuous at ς(θ), then
lim
q→p,qk<ς(θ)
(DkP
L
k )(θ,p) =
(
eϑ(θ)
eϑ(θ) +
∑
i 6=k e
ui(θ,pi)
)
lim
qk↑ς(θ)
ψk(θ, qk)
To prove the integrability, we first note that for all j, k and p we have
∣∣∣(DkPLj )(θ,p)∣∣∣ ≤
ψk(θ, pk). This bound is a consequence of the formula above, and is tight as p−k varies.
The mean value theorem for functions of a single real variable states that
h−1(PLj (θ,p+ hek)− PLj (θ,p)) = (DkPLj )(θ,p+ ηek)
for some η such that |η| < |h|, and thus
|h|−1 ∣∣PLj (θ,p+ hek)− PLj (θ,p)∣∣ ≤ ψk(θ, pk + η) ≤ ϕ(θ)
for µ-a.e. θ ∈ T and small enough h. Thus, the desired uniform µ-integrability follows
from Assumption 2.3, Condition (ii). 
An “easier” bound is simply
∣∣∣(DkPLj )(θ,p)∣∣∣ ≤ |(Dwk)(θ, pk)|, and thus we might con-
sider changing the statement of Proposition 2.4 to hypothesize only the uniform µ-integrability
of the utility price derivatives. In fact, this bound can be used to validate the Leibniz Rule
for the Boyd and Mellman model of Example 1 that lacks an outside good. However, this
bound fails to be useful for the Berry et al. model of Example 2, since w(p) = α log(ς(θ)−p)
and |(Dwk)(θ, pk)| = α/(ς(θ)−p) is singular on ς−1(p). In empirical applications, ς is onto,
generating a singularity somewhere in T for all p; this singularity cannot be “controlled” for
all p by choosing the measure µ. In this case, a hypothesis only about the price derivatives
of utility is not useful.
We close this section by stating some basic results concerning (D˜P)(p) that are used
below.
Lemma 2.5. Under Assumption 2.1, Pj(p) and λj(p) are never zero on (0, ς∗)
J . Thus
Λ(p) is nonsingular for all p ∈ (0, ς∗)J .
Proof. Note that L(pj) is nonempty and has positive µ-measure, PLj (·,p) is strictly positive
on L(pj), and (Dwj)(·, pj)PLj (·,p) is strictly negative on L(pj). It follows that Pj(p) and
λj(p) are nonzero. 
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Lemma 2.6. Let p ∈ (0, ς∗)J , suppose ϑ : T → (−∞,∞), and define
Ωf (p) = Λf (p)
−1Γf (p)
⊤ ∈ RJf×Jf for all f(11)
Ω˜(p) = Λ(p)−1Γ˜(p)⊤ ∈ RJ×J .(12)
These matrices are well-defined by Lemma 2.5, and have the following properties:
(i) (DfPf )(p)
⊤ = Λf (p)(I −Ωf (p)) and (D˜P)(p)⊤ = Λ(p)(I − Ω˜(p)).
(ii) ||Ωf (p)||∞ < 1 and ||Ω˜(p)||∞ < 1.
(iii) I − Ωf (p) ∈ RJf×Jf and I − Ω˜(p) ∈ RJ×J are strictly diagonally dominant and
nonsingular.
(iv) (I−Ωf (p))−1 ∈ RJf×Jf and (I− Ω˜(p))−1 ∈ RJ×J map positive vectors to positive
vectors.
Proof. (i) This follows immediately from Prop. 2.3.
(ii) We note that
ωk,l(p) =
γl,k(p)
λk(p)
=
∫
L(pk)
PLl (θ,p)dµk,p(θ)
where µk,p is the probability distribution with density, with respect to µ, given by
dµk,p(θ) =
PLk (θ,p) |(Dwk)(θ, pk)| dµ(θ)∫
L(pk)
PLk (φ,p) |(Dwk)(φ, pk)| dµ(φ)
.
Thus Λf (p)
−1Γf (p)
⊤ has row sums
∫ ∑
j∈Jf
PLj (θ,p)

 dµk,p(θ) < 1.
The additional assumption that ϑ : T → (−∞,∞) plays a role in establishing this
inequality because then there is always a set T ′k ⊂ T with µk,p(T ′k) > 0 on which∑
j∈Jf
PLj (θ,p) < 1.
(iii) The inequality
1 >
∫ ∑
j∈Jf
PLj (θ,p)

 dµk,p(θ)
is equivalent to
|1− ωk,k(p)| = 1−
∫
PLk (θ,p)dµk,p(θ)
>
∫  ∑
j∈Jf\k
PLj (θ,p)

 dµk,p(θ) =∑
l 6=k
ωk,l(p).
The claim follows.
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(iii) Because Ωf (p) maps positive vectors to positive vectors, so does its power series
∞∑
n=1
Ωf (p)
n = (I−Ωf (p))−1.

Corollary 2.7. (DfPf )(p)
⊤ and (D˜P)(p)⊤ are strictly diagonally dominant and nonsin-
gular for p ∈ (0, ς∗1).
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 2.6, claims (i) and (iii). 
2.7. The BLP-Markup Equation. A prominent form of the first-order conditions Eqn.
(7) is the BLP-markup equation:
(13) p = c+ η(p) where η(p) = −(D˜P)(p)−⊤P(p).
Note that η is defined for any continuously differentiable choice probabilities with nonsin-
gular (D˜P)(p)⊤. We have shown above that this applies to certain Mixed Logit models
(Section 2.6). Eqn. (13) and Corollary 2.7 show that η is well-defined and continuous, at
least for p ∈ (0, ς∗)J .
Traditionally, the BLP-markup equation (13) has been used to estimate costs assuming
observed prices are in equilibrium via the formula c = p − η(p); see, e.g., Berry et al.
(1995) or Nevo (2000a). These cost estimates form the basis of counterfactual experiments
with an estimated demand model. Beresteanu and Li (2008) have recently suggested that
the BLP-markup equation is also useful for computing equilibrium prices, a suggestion
we explore further below. Note that the BLP-markup equation must be interpreted as a
nonlinear fixed-point equation when applied to compute equilibrium prices.
We now derive several important properties of η from an alternative form of Eqn. (13)
based on Lemma 2.6, valid when p ∈ (0, ς∗)J :
(14)
(
I− Ω˜(p)
)
η(p) = −Λ(p)−1P(p).
First, Eqn. (14) proves that profit-optimal markups are positive for the class of Mixed
Logit models we consider, thanks to Lemma 2.6, claim (iv).
Corollary 2.8. Suppose Assumptions 2.1-2.3 hold. Then η(p) > 0 for all p ∈ (0, ς∗)J .
Hence if p ∈ (0, ς∗)J is a local equilibrium, then p > c.
Second, Eqn. (14), rather than Eqn. (13), should be used to actually compute η. Recall
that κ2(A) denotes the 2-norm condition number of the matrix A (Trefethen and Bau,
1997).
Lemma 2.9. Suppose Assumptions 2.1-2.3 hold. Eqn. (14) is better conditioned than
Eqn. (13), in the sense that
κ2
(
I− Ω˜(p)) ≤ (minj |λj(p)|
maxj |λj(p)|
)
κ2
(
(D˜P)(p)⊤
)
for all p ∈ (0, ς∗1).
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Proof. This follows from Lemma 2.6, claim (i), the inequality κ2(AB) ≤ κ2(A)κ2(B) valid
for any matrices A and B, and the formula
κ2(Λ(p)
−1) =
minj |λj(p)|
maxj |λj(p)| .

Lemma 2.9 states that the greater the variation in aggregate absolute rate of change in
inclusive values, the more poorly conditioned (D˜P)(p)⊤ is relative to I − Ω˜(p). Because
Λ(p) is diagonal, ||Λ(p)||1 = ||Λ(p)||2 = ||Λ(p)||∞ and thus the same bound applies for
condition numbers in norms other than the 2-norm.
Third, Eqn. (14) also provides bounds on the magnitude of values taken by η:
Lemma 2.10. Suppose Assumptions 2.1-2.3 hold. For all p ∈ (0, ς∗)J , η satisfies
(15)
||Λ(p)−1P(p)||∞
1 + ||Ω˜(p)||∞
≤ ||η(p)||∞ ≤ ||Λ(p)
−1P(p)||∞
1− ||Ω˜(p)||∞
.
Proof. This follows immediately from Eqn. (14), using the triangle inequality. 
The upper bound suggests the following assumptions to ensure that η itself is bounded:
Assumption 2.4. Suppose there exist M ∈ (0,∞) and ε ∈ (0, 1) such that
sup
{||Λ(p)−1P(p)||∞ : p ∈ (0, ς∗)J} =M <∞(16)
sup
{||Ω˜(p)||∞ : p ∈ (0, ς∗)J} = 1− ε < 1.(17)
Under simple Logit, PLk (p)/ |λk(p)| = |(Dwk)(pk)|−1 and Ωf (p) = 1PLf (p)⊤. Thus Eqn.
(16) is akin to concavity of wk for all sufficiently large pk, and Eqn. (17) is implied by
ϑ > −∞, i.e. the existence of an outside good with positive purchase probability.
Lemma 2.11. Suppose Assumptions 2.1-2.3 hold.
(i) If Assumption 2.4 also holds, N = sup{||η(p)||∞ : p ∈ (0, ς∗)J} <∞.
(ii) Moreover Eqn. (16) in Assumption 2.4 is necessary for N to be finite.
Unfortunately some simple models do not satisfy Assumption 2.4. A simple Logit model
with w(p) = −α log p for some α > 0 violates Eqn. (16). More generally, the Boyd and
Mellman (1980) model of Example 1 does not satisfy Eqn. (16). This is most easily seen
by noting that finite-sample approximations to this model have
lim
pk→∞
||Λ(p)−1P(p)||∞ = max
s=1,...,S
{
1
αs
}
where {αs}Ss=1 are the sampled price coefficients. Of course, as S →∞, mins=1,...,S{αs} →
0, and thus ||Λ(p)−1P(p)||∞ →∞.
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2.8. The ζ-Markup function. Substituting Eqn. (9) into Eqn. (7) yields the ζ-markup
equation introduced in Morrow and Skerlos (2010):
(18) p = c+ ζ(p) where ζ(p) = Λ(p)−1Γ˜(p)⊤(p− c)−Λ(p)−1P(p)
when Λ(p) is nonsingular (Section 2.6, 2.8). Thus the ζ-markup equation is specific to
Mixed Logit models, unlike the BLP-markup equation.
We observe a relationship between the maps ζ and η.
Proposition 2.12. Suppose Assumption 2.1-2.3 hold. For any p ∈ (0, ς∗)J , ζ(p) =
Ω˜(p)(p− c) + (I− Ω˜(p))η(p).
Proof. This follows directly from Eqns. (14) and (18). 
In so far as η and ζ are distinct maps, they can generate numerical methods for the
computation of equilibrium prices with entirely different properties. The equation above
implies that ζ(p) = η(p) if, and only if, p− c− η(p) = p− c− ζ(p) lies in the null space
of Ω˜(p). Thus if Ω˜(p) is full-rank, ζ and η coincide only at simultaneously stationary
prices. Simple examples of Mixed Logit models can be constructed that always have
rank(Ω˜(p)) = J . For Logit, Ωf (p) = 1P
L
f (p)
⊤ for all f and Ω˜(p) always has rank
F ≤ J . However the analysis in Morrow and Skerlos (2008) can be used to show that ζ
and η coincide only at simultaneously stationary prices.
We now explore ζ’s asymptotic properties.
Lemma 2.13. Under Assumption 2.4 ||ζ(p)||∞ < ||p− c||∞ whenever ||p− c||∞ > M/ε.
Moreover ||p− c||∞ − ||ζ(p)||∞ →∞ as ||p− c||∞ →∞.
Proof. We simply note that
||ζ(p)||∞ ≤ ||Ω˜(p)||∞||p− c||∞ + ||Λ(p)−1P(p)||∞
≤ (1− ε)||p − c||∞ +M
≤ ||p− c||∞ −
(
ε||p− c||∞ −M
)
≤
[
1− ε+ M||p− c||∞
]
||p− c||∞
Now if ||p− c||∞ > M/ε, then M/||p− c||∞ < ε. Thus
||ζ(p)||∞ < [1− ε+ ε] ||p− c||∞ = ||p− c||∞.
To prove that ||p− c||∞ − ||ζ(p)||∞ →∞, note that
||p− c||∞ − ||ζ(p)||∞ ≥
(
ε− M||p− c||∞
)
||p− c||∞
For all ||p − c||∞ > M/ε, the term in parentheses is positive. Furthermore, this term
approaches ε as ||p− c||∞ →∞. Thus ||p− c||∞ − ||ζ(p)||∞ →∞ as ||p− c||∞ →∞. 
A slightly different assumption concerning Ω˜(p) is useful when analyzing the ζ map.
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Assumption 2.5. Suppose
(19) sup
{
||Ω˜(p)(p − c)||∞ : p ∈ (0, ς∗)J
}
<∞,
Lemma 2.14. Suppose Assumption 2.1-2.3 holds and ς∗ =∞. Then ζ is bounded if, and
only if, Eqn. (16) and Eqn. (19) hold.
Proof. This follows directly from the triangle inequality and the non-negativity of Ω˜(p)(p−
c) and −Λ(p)−1P(p) for all p ≥ c. 
For future reference, we prove that Eqn. (19) strengthens Eqn. (17).
Lemma 2.15. If Eqn. (19) holds, then Eqn. (17) holds.
Proof. Note that Eqn. (19) implies that for any k,
lim
pj→∞
(
ωk,j(p)(pj − cj)
)
<∞ for all j ∈ Jf(k).
This, in turn, implies that ωk,j(p)→ 0 as pj →∞.
Now Eqn. (17) fails only if limp→q||Ω˜(p)||∞ = 1 where q has some qj = ∞. But the
row sums of Ω˜(p) satisfy
lim
p→q

 ∑
j∈Jf(k)
ωk,j(p)

 = ∑
j∈Jf(k)∪{j:qj<∞}
ωk,j(q) < 1.
Thus if Eqn. (19) holds, Eqn. (17) cannot fail. 
2.9. Existence of Simultaneously Stationary Prices. This section provides two ex-
istence results. Neither establish the existence of a local equilibrium, or the uniqueness of
simultaneously stationary points. To address the existence of local equilibrium will require
additional conditions to ensure that each firm’s profits are locally concave at the simulta-
neously stationary prices whose existence can be ensured (Morrow, 2008). Little is known
about how to address the uniqueness of simultaneously stationary points. Indeed, Mor-
row and Skerlos (2010) provide an example of a Mixed Logit model with 9 simultaneously
stationary prices, 4 of which are local equilibria and 2 of which are proper equilibria.
Assumption 2.4 ensures the existence of finite simultaneously stationary prices when
ς∗ =∞.
Corollary 2.16. Suppose ς∗ = ∞ and Assumptions 2.1-2.3, 2.4 hold. Then there exists
at least one vector of finite simultaneously stationary prices.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem. c+η(·) is a continu-
ous map that takes the compact, convex set [0,M/ε]J into itself, and thus there is at least
one fixed-point p = c+ η(p) ∈ [0,M/ε]J . 
To apply Corollary 2.16 to cases when ς∗ < ∞, η must be extended from (0, ς∗) to
all of PJ preserving the bounds (15). This is easy for many of the simulation-based
approximations encountered in practice, but difficult for the general case.
We can extend this existence result using Eqn. (22) and the ζ map.
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Lemma 2.17. Suppose ς∗ = ∞, Assumptions 2.1-2.3, Eqn. (19), and Eqn. (22) hold.
Then there exists some q¯k > ck such that pk − ck − ζk(p) > 0 for all p with pk ≥ q¯k.
Proof. The assumed bound implies∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈Jf
ωk,j(p)(pj − cj)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ L <∞
for any k and any p ∈ (0,∞)J . Consider
pk − ck − ζk(p) = (pk − ck)−
∑
j∈Jf
ωk,j(p)(pj − cj) + Pk(p)
λk(p)
=
(
1− Pk(p)|λk(p)| (pk − ck)
)
(pk − ck)−
∑
j∈Jf
ωk,j(p)(pj − cj)
If Eqn. (22) holds, then
0 ≤ lim
pk→∞
[
Pk(p)
|λk(p)| (pk − ck)
]
≤ δ < 1.
Thus for any ǫ > 0, there exists some p¯k > 0 and △(p) with |△(p)| < ǫ such that
Pk(p)
λk(p)(pk − ck) ≤ δ +△(p) for all pk > p¯k.
Thus
pk − ck − ζk(p) ≥ (1− δ +△(p))(pk − ck)− L for all pk > p¯k.
In particular, if we choose ǫ ≤ (1− δ)/2 we have
pk − ck − ζk(p) ≥
(
1− δ
2
)
(pk − ck)− L =
(
1− δ
2
)(
pk − ck − 2L
1− δ
)
> 0
for all pk ≥ q¯k = max{ck + 2L/(1 − δ), p¯k}. 
One consequence of this lemma is that infinite prices are never an equilibrium.
Corollary 2.18. Under the assumptions of Lemma 2.17, any profit derivative is eventually
negative.
Proof. Note that
(Dkπˆf(k))(p) = − |λk(p)| (pk − ck − ζk(p)).
Since pk − ck − ζk(p) is positive for all large enough pk, (Dkπˆf(k))(p) is negative for all
large enough pk, regardless of p−k. 
Another consequence of Lemma 2.17 is an alternative existence result.
Corollary 2.19. Under the assumptions of Lemma 2.17 there exists at least one simulta-
neously stationary point.
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Proof. Following Morrow and Skerlos (2008), we prove this proposition using the Poincare-
Hopf Theorem (Milnor, 1965). The logic is simple: We will consider the vector field
p−c−ζ(p) on a hyper-rectangle [c, q¯] whose critical points are simultaneously stationary;
q¯ has components q¯k defined in Lemma 2.17. The Poincare-Hopf Theorem then states that
the sum of the indices of all the critical points of this vector field equals one, the Euler
characteristic of [c, q¯]. Thus it is not possible that the vector field have no critical points,
for then the sum of indices would be zero.
We must only prove one property of p− c− ζ(p): that this vector field points outward
on the boundary of the chosen hyper-rectangle. Half of this proof is Lemma 2.17, in which
we prove that pk − ck − ζk(p) > 0 if p ∈ [c, q¯] with pk = q¯k. We must also show that
pk − ck − ζk(p) < 0 if p ∈ [c, q¯] with pk = ck. But
ck − ck − ζk(p) = −

∑
j∈Jf
ωk,j(p)(pj − cj) + Pk(p)|λk(p)|

 < 0.

This proof does not need to make any claims about the number of critical points, or of
their indices. If it can be shown that any critical point of p− c− ζ(p) cannot have a zero
or negative index, then the simultaneously stationary point is unique.
3. Computational Methods
This section provides details for the four approaches to computing equilibrium prices
described in Morrow and Skerlos (2010); see Table 4. Section 3.1 briefly reviews Newton’s
method, followed by application of Newton’s method to solve Eqn. (7) in Section 3.2.
Newton’s method applied directly to Eqn. (7) may compute “spurious” solutions with
infinite prices because the combined gradient vanishes as prices increase without bound.
Section 3.3 avoids this difficulty by applying Newton’s method to the two markup equations
instead of Eqn. (7) itself. Section 3.4 discusses fixed-point iterations based on the BLP-
and ζ-markup equations, and Section 3.5 reviews a number of practical considerations.
3.1. Newton’s Method. Newton’s method, a classical technique to compute a zero of
an arbitrary function F : RJ → RJ , is now a portfolio of related approaches to solve non-
linear systems (Ortega and Rheinboldt, 1970; Kelley, 1995; Dennis and Schnabel, 1996;
Judd, 1998; Kelley, 2003). Generally speaking, Newton-type methods are differentiated in
two relatively independent directions: (i) the technique used to approximate the Jacobian
matrices (DF) and solve for the Newton step and (ii) the technique used to enforce conver-
gence from arbitrary initial conditions. See Dennis and Schnabel (1996), Judd (1998), or
Kelley (2003) for good treatments of these issues. Choosing the right variant of Newton’s
method determines the reliability and efficiency of equilibrium price computations.
Problem formulation also determines the reliability and efficiency of equilibrium price
computations using Newton’s method. Scalings of the variables and function values are
one prominent example of a problem transformation that improves the performance of
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Table 4. Summary of the numerical methods examined in this article.
Newton Methods (NM)
Abbr. Method Section Advantage Our Experience(a)
CG-NM Solve Fπ(p) = (∇˜πˆ)(p) = 0 3.2 − Unreliable, slow
η-NM Solve Fη(p) = p− c− η(p) = 0 3.3 Coercive Reliable, slow
ζ-NM Solve Fζ(p) = p− c− ζ(p) = 0 3.3 Coercive Reliable, slow
Fixed-Point Iterations (FPI)
Abbr. Method Section Advantage Our Experience
ζ-FPI Iterate p← c+ ζ(p) 3.4 Easy to evaluate Reliable, fast
η-FPI Iterate p← c+ η(p) 3.4 − Not convergent
(a) Conclusions on behavior of these methods is based on the numerical experiments
described in Morrow and Skerlos (2010), using a novel GMRES-Newton method with
Levenberg-Marquardt style trust-region global convergence strategy.
Newton’s method (Dennis and Schnabel, 1996). Nonlinear problem preconditioning can
also be important (Cai and Keyes, 2002), as the following example demonstrates.
Example 5. Let F : RN → RN be defined by F(x) = x/(1 + ||x||22). Iterating Newton
steps converges to the unique (finite) zero x∗ = 0 only from initial conditions x0 with
||x0||2 < 1/
√
3. Newton’s method diverges or fails for all other starting points. Standard
global convergence strategies for Newton’s method (line search, trust region methods) cannot
improve this poor global convergence behavior because ||F(x)||2 has unbounded level sets;
see Morrow and Skerlos (2010) for details.
A simple nonlinear transformation overcomes this poor global convergence behavior. Note
that F(x) = A(x)f(x) where A(x) = (1 + ||x||22)−1I and f(x) = x. Because A(x) is
nonsingular for all x, the problems F(x) = 0 and f(x) = 0 have identical solution sets.
However applying Newton’s method to the problem f(x) = 0 trivially converges in a single
step from any initial condition without a global convergence strategy.
Example 5 illustrates why computing equilibrium prices based on the markup equations
is more reliable and efficient than using Eqn. (7) directly. The following two sections echo
the pattern of this example to provide the details.
3.2. Newton’s Method on the Combined Gradient. The most direct approach to
compute equilibrium prices using Newton’s method is to solve Fπ(p) = (∇˜πˆ)(p) = 0,
abbreviated CG-NM in Table 4. This approach works well when the initial condition is near
an equilibrium, as required by theory (Ortega and Rheinboldt, 1970; Kelley, 1995; Dennis
and Schnabel, 1996). In practice, computing counterfactual equilibrium prices starting with
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the observed prices may exploit this local convergence if changes to exogeneous variables
have a relatively small impact on equilibrium prices. On the other hand, CG-NM can be
unreliable when started “far” from equilibrium.
The challenge is the tendency for the derivatives of profits to vanish as prices become
large Morrow and Skerlos (2010), as demonstrated in Example 6 below.
Example 6. Consider a simple Logit model with linear in price utility and an outside good:
u(p) = −αp + v for some α > 0 and any v ∈ R, and ϑ > −∞. The derivative of firm f ’s
profit function with respect to the price of product k ∈ Jf is
(Dkπˆf )(p) = −αPLk (p)(pk − ck) + αPLk (p)πˆf (p) + PLk (p).
Since PLk (p) and P
L
k (p)(pk − ck) both vanish as pk → ∞ (as is easily checked), πˆf (p) is
bounded in p. Thus (Dkπˆf )(p)→ 0 as pk →∞.
We now provide a general assumption under which (Dkπˆf(k))(p)→ 0 as pk ↑ ς∗.
Assumption 3.1. Let ψk be defined as in Assumption 2.3. Assume: (i) pkψk(θ, pk) →
0 as pk ↑ ς(θ) for µ-a.e. θ. (ii) There exists M < ∞ and p¯k ∈ [0, ς∗) such that
pk
∫
ψk(θ, pk)dµ(θ) ≤M for all pk ∈ (p¯k, ς∗).
As with Assumption 2.3 above, (i) and (ii) are essentially conditions for the Dominated
Convergence Theorem.
Assumption 3.1 (i) extends Assumption 2.3 (i) to include a neighborhood of ς∗. Note
that if ς(θ) < ∞ then (i) holds if, and only if, ψk(θ, pk) → 0 as pk ↑ ς(θ); i.e. ψk(θ, ·)
is continuous at ς(θ). Thus if ς(θ) < ∞ Assumption 3.1 (i) and Assumption 2.3 (i) are
the same. If ς(θ) = ∞ and pkψk(θ, pk) → 0 as pk ↑ ∞, then necessarily ψk(θ, pk) → 0 as
pk ↑ ∞. The converse, however, need not hold.
If ς∗ <∞, Assumption 3.1 (ii) simply says that
∫
ψk(θ, pk)dµ(θ) is bounded as pk ↑ ς∗.
This is not implied by Assumption 2.3 (ii), but is a natural extension of it.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose Assumptions 2.1-3.1 hold. Then pk |λk(p)| → 0 as pk ↑ ς∗ for all
k. Additionally, pk |γj,k(p)| → 0 as pk ↑ ς∗ for all j. Subsequently, (Dkπˆf(k))(p) → 0 as
pk ↑ ς∗.
Proof. Let {p(n)k }n∈N ⊂ (0, ς∗) be any sequence converging to ς∗. Define Ψ(n)k : T → P by
Ψ
(n)
k (θ) = p
(n)
k ψk(θ, p
(n)
k ). The functions {Ψ(n)k }n∈N converge pointwise to zero and have
integrals uniformly bounded by the constant M . By the Dominated Convergence Theorem
lim
n→∞
∫
Ψ
(n)
k (θ)dµ(θ) =
∫ (
lim
n→∞
Ψ
(n)
k (θ)
)
dµ(θ) = 0.

In other words, under Assumption 3.1 the components of Fπ vanish as the corresponding
price tends to ς∗ even though this may not mean that ς∗ maximizes profits. Because of
this, CG-NM may converge to a zero of Fπ at ς∗1, or with some components equal to ς∗,
that is not an equilibrium.
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Note that even though the price derivatives vanish at infinity, this does not mean that
infinite prices maximize profits. Nonetheless, CG-NM may converge to a zero of Fπ with
some components equal to infinity that is not an equilibrium. Moreover, because the com-
ponents of Fπ(p) can vanish over some divergent sequences, standard global convergence
strategies based on minimizing ||Fπ(p)||2 will not be effective ways of avoiding this behav-
ior. As in Example 5, we must reformulate the problem to obtain reliable and efficient
approaches for computing equilibrium prices.
3.3. Newton’s Method and the Markup Equations. Reliable and efficient implemen-
tations of Newton’s method are found by observing that the combined gradient, Fπ, can
be written as follows:
Fπ(p) = (D˜P)(p)
⊤Fη(p) where Fη(p) = p− c− η(p)(20)
Fπ(p) = Λ(p)Fζ(p) where Fζ(p) = p− c− ζ(p).(21)
Either Fη or Fζ can be used to compute simultaneously stationary prices when (D˜P)(p)
⊤
and Λ(p), respectively, are nonsingular (Morrow and Skerlos, 2010). Of course, Fη and
Fζ recast the first-order condition as a fixed-point problem: Fη is zero if and only if the
BLP-markup equation holds, and Fζ is zero if and only if the ζ-markup equation holds.
Solving Fη(p) = 0 or Fζ(p) = 0, abbreviated η-NM and ζ-NM respectively in Table
4, requires the solution of nontrivial nonlinear systems with Newton’s method. η-NM and
ζ-NM, however, are less likely to have the computational problems that CG-NM exhibits
because they exploit norm-coercivity of the maps Fη and Fζ (Morrow and Skerlos, 2010).
A norm-coercive map has a norm that tends to infinity with the norm of its argument (Or-
tega and Rheinboldt, 1970; Harker and Pang, 1990). Globally convergent implementations
of Newton’s method that decrease the value of ||F(p)||2 in each step produce bounded
sequences of iterates when F is norm-coercive. Thus, solving the BLP- or ζ-markup equa-
tion instead of the literal first-order condition removes the tendency for applications of
Newton’s method to compute “spurious” solutions at infinity.
We now prove that the maps Fη and Fζ are indeed coercive.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose ς∗ =∞ and Assumption 2.1-2.3 hold.
(i) Norm-coercivity of Fζ(p) implies that of Fη(p).
(ii) If Eqn. (17) holds, then norm-coercivity of Fη(p) implies that of Fζ(p).
Proof. Proposition 2.12 implies that
p− c− ζ(p) = (I− Ω˜(p))(p− c− η(p)).
To prove (i), note that
||p− c− η(p)||∞ ≥
(
1
1 + ||Ω˜(p)||∞
)
||p− c− ζ(p)||∞ ≥
(
1
2
)
||p− c− ζ(p)||∞.
To prove (ii), note that if Eqn. (17) holds,
||p− c− ζ(p)||∞ ≥
(
1− ||Ω(p)||∞
)||p− c− η(p)||∞ ≥ ε||p− c− η(p)||∞.

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Lemma 3.3. Suppose ς∗ =∞ and Assumption 2.1-2.3 and 2.4 hold. Then
lim
||p||∞→∞
||p− c− η(p)||∞ =∞ = lim
||p||∞→∞
||p− c− ζ(p)||∞.
Proof. The norm-coercivity of η is a trivial consequence of the boundedness of η under
Assumption 2.4. The norm-coercivity of ζ then follows from Lemma 3.2. 
We now weaken Assumption 2.4’s Eqn. (16).
Assumption 3.2. Suppose that ς∗ =∞ and
lim
M↑∞
sup
{ ||Λ(p)−1P(p)||∞
||p||∞ : p ∈ P
J , ||p||∞ ≥M
}
= δ ∈ [0, 1).(22)
Note that the limit is of a non-increasing sequence of non-negative numbers, and thus
exists.
Lemma 3.4. Assuming Eqn. (22) is equivalent to assuming that for any sequence pn with
||pn||∞ →∞, limn→∞||Λ(pn)−1P(pn)||∞/||pn||∞ ≤ δ.
Proof. If Eqn. (22) holds, then for any ε > 0 there exists an M > 0 such that
sup
{ ||Λ(p)−1P(p)||∞
||p||∞ : p ∈ P
J , ||p||∞ ≥M
}
< δ + ε.
If ||pn||∞ →∞, then there is also an Nǫ such that ||pn||∞ ≥M for all n > Nǫ. Thus
||Λ(pn)−1P(pn)||∞
||pn||∞ < δ + ε
for all n > Nǫ, and thus
lim
n→∞
[ ||Λ(pn)−1P(pn)||∞
||pn||∞
]
≤ δ.
Conversely, if Eqn. (22) fails, then there is a M¯ > 0 such that
S(M) = sup
{ ||Λ(p)−1P(p)||∞
||p||∞ : p ∈ P
J , ||p||∞ ≥M
}
≥ 1
for all M ≥ M¯ . We can thus choose pM with ||pM ||∞ ≥M satisfying
1− ||Λ(pM )
−1P(pM )||∞
||pM ||∞ ≤ S(M)−
||Λ(pM )−1P(pM )||∞
||pM ||∞ ≤
1
M
.
In other words,
||Λ(pM )−1P(pM )||∞
||pM ||∞ ≥ 1−
1
M
for all M ≥ M¯ , and thus
lim
M→∞
[ ||Λ(pM )−1P(pM )||∞
||pM ||∞
]
≥ 1.
Hence the “sequence version” of Eqn. (22) fails, and thus by contraposition the sequence
version and Eqn. (22) are identical. 
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Next we note that Eqn. (22) weakens Eqn. (16).
Lemma 3.5. If Eqn. (16) holds, then Eqn. (22) holds.
Proof. If sup{||Λ(p)−1P(p)||∞ : p ∈ PJ} ≤M , then
S(L) = sup
{ ||Λ(p)−1P(p)||∞
||p||∞ : p ∈ P
J , ||p||∞ ≥ L
}
≤ M
L
.
Thus limL→∞ S(L) = 0, a special case of Eqn. (22). 
Now we prove the alternative coercivity result.
Lemma 3.6. Suppose ς∗ =∞ and Assumptions 2.1-2.3, 2.5 and 3.2 hold. Then
lim
||p||∞→∞
||p− c− η(p)||∞ =∞ = lim
||p||∞→∞
||p− c− ζ(p)||∞.
Proof. We prove the claim for ζ; the result for η then follows from Lemma 2.15. Note that∣∣∣∣∣∣pk − ck −
∑
j∈Jf(k)
ωk,j(p)(pj − cj)− Pk(p)
λk(p)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
1− Pk(p)
pkλk(p)
)
pk − ck −
∑
j∈Jf(k)
ωk,j(p)(pj − cj)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣1− Pk(p)pkλk(p)
∣∣∣∣ pk −
∣∣∣∣∣ck +
∑
j∈Jf(k)
ωk,j(p)(pj − cj)
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Suppose that pk →∞. By assumption,
lim
n→∞
[
1− Pk(p)
pkλk(p)
]
≥ 1− δ > 0
while the second term is bounded. Thus∣∣∣∣∣∣pk − ck −
∑
j∈Jf(k)
ωk,j(p)(pj − cj)− Pk(p)
λk(p)
∣∣∣∣∣∣→∞.

Note that since we did not require that Eqn. (17) held, ζ need not be bounded for Fη
and Fζ to be coercive.
3.4. Fixed-Point Iteration. In addition to applications of Newton’s method, the BLP-
and ζ-markup equations suggest applying fixed-point iteration to solve for equilibrium
prices. We examine fixed-point iterations based on both equations.
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3.4.1. ζ Fixed-Point Iteration. The fixed-point iteration p ← c + ζ(p) based on the ζ-
markup equation, here abbreviated ζ-FPI, can efficiently compute equilibrium prices for
some problems. ζ-FPI has relatively efficient steps because no linear systems need to be
solved, unlike every other method listed in Table 4. While we are not aware of a general
convergence proof for ζ-FPI, this iteration has converged reliably on test problems including
the examples in Morrow and Skerlos (2010).
The first observation we make is that the ζ-FPI steps always point in directions of
“myopic gradient ascent.”
Lemma 3.7. Let p ∈ (0, ς∗)J , and let δp = c+ ζ(p)− p denote the ζ-FPI step. Then
1
maxj |λj(p)| ≤
(∇˜πˆ)(p)⊤δp
(∇˜πˆ)(p)⊤(∇˜πˆ)(p) ≤
1
minj |λj(p)| .
Similarly, let θ(p) denote the angle between δp and (∇˜πˆ)(p), and suppose p is not simul-
taneously stationary. Then
cos θ(p) ≥ minj |λj(p)|
maxj |λj(p)| .
Proof. Both results follows directly from the equation (∇˜πˆ)(p) = |Λ(p)| δp where |Λ(p)|
denotes the absolute value of the components of Λ(p). 
Specifically, the ζ-FPI steps have a positive projection onto the combined gradient, and
cannot become orthogonal to the combined gradient over any sequence of non-simultaneously
stationary prices that stay in (0, ς∗)
J .
If F = 1, and the equilibrium problem is an optimization problem, this implies ζ-FPI
has steps that point in gradient ascent directions and, when properly scaled, converge
to local maximizers of profit. More specifically, ζ-FPI cannot converge to minimizers of
profits. This may generate the properties of ζ-FPI observed in Example 10 from Morrow
and Skerlos (2010).
Corollary 3.8. Let Assumptions 2.1-2.4 hold, and suppose {p(n)}∞n=1 is the ζ-FPI se-
quence. Then {p(n)}∞n=1 is bounded.
Proof. By Lemma 2.13, for any sufficiently large M > 0 we can find some L > 0 such that
||ζ(p)||∞ < ||p− c||∞ −M for all ||p− c||∞ > L.
If the ζ-FPI sequence diverges, then for any such L there is an N such that
||p(n) − c||∞ > L for all n > N.
But then
||p(n+1) − c||∞ = ||ζ(p(n))||∞ < ||p(n) − c||∞ −M < ||p(n) − c||∞ for all n > N,
which states that the ζ-FPI sequence is decreasing. This is a contradiction of the hypothesis
that the ζ-FPI sequence diverges. 
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To implement ζ-FPI, one simply needs to iterate the assignment p ← c + ζ(p) where
Eqn. (18) defines ζ(p). As shown in Table 5 below, integral approximations, rather than
the actual computation of the step, drive the computational burden. Given a price vector,
utilities, and utility derivatives, computing P(p), Λ(p), and Γ˜(p) for a set of S samples
requires O(S∑Ff=1 J2f ) floating point operations (flops), while the fixed-point step itself
only requiresO(∑Ff=1 J2f ) flops. Note that computing the fixed-point step c+ζ(p) requires
an equivalent amount of work as computing the combined gradient (∇˜πˆ)(p). Furthermore,
because Λ(p) is a diagonal matrix, no serious obstacles to computing the fixed point step
arise as J becomes large.
3.4.2. η Fixed-Point Iteration. The fixed-point iteration p← c+η(p), abbreviated η-FPI,
based on the BLP-markup equation need not converge. Example 7 below, repeated from
Morrow and Skerlos (2010), gives a case in which η can fail to be even locally convergent.
Example 7. Consider multi-product monopoly pricing with a simple Logit model having
uj(p) = −αp + vj for some α > 0, any vj ∈ R, and ϑ > −∞. It is well known that
for a single-product firm, unique profit-maximizing prices exist (Anderson and de Palma,
1988; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Caplin and Nalebuff, 1991). Morrow (2008) proves that
profit-optimal prices p∗ are unique for the multi-product case − and even so with multiple
firms − even though profits are not quasi-concave (Hanson and Martin, 1996).
In this example, η-FPI is not always locally convergent near p∗, while ζ-FPI is al-
ways superlinearly locally convergent. For an arbitrary continuously differentiable function
F and p∗ = F(p∗), F is contractive on some neighborhood of p∗ in some norm ||·|| if
ρ((DF)(p∗)) < 1 where ρ(A) (Ortega and Rheinboldt, 1970). We show that ρ((Dη)(p∗)) >
1 may hold while ρ((Dζ)(p∗)) = 0, where ρ(A) denotes the spectral radius of the matrix
A.
The components of the BLP-markup function η are given by ηk(p) = α
−1(1−∑Jj=1 PLj (p))−1
for all k. From this formula the equation
ρ((Dη)(p∗)) =
∑J
j=1 P
L
j (p∗)
1−∑Jj=1 PLj (p∗) =
J∑
j=1
euj(pj,∗)−ϑ
can be derived. For valuations of the outside good, ϑ, sufficiently close to −∞, ρ((Dη)(p∗)) >
1 can hold; see Morrow and Skerlos (2010) for details.
To prove the claim regarding ρ((Dζ)(p∗)), note that ζk(p) = πˆ(p) + 1/α, and thus
(Dlζk)(p∗) = (Dlπˆ)(p∗) = 0 for all k, l.
Even if the BLP-markup equation does generate a convergent fixed-point iteration, eval-
uating η involves the solution of F linear systems that grow in size with the number of
products offered by the firms. The work required to evaluate η using a direct method like
PLU or QR factorization is O([maxf Jf ]3), given values of P(p), Λ(p), and Γ˜(p) as approx-
imated using simulation. The work to evaluate ζ is only O([maxf Jf ]2) given P(p), Λ(p),
and Γ˜(p) (Table 5). Generally speaking, function evaluations must be cheap for the linear
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convergence of fixed-point iterations to result in faster computations than the superlinearly
or quadratically convergent variants of Newton’s method.
3.5. Practical Considerations. This section addresses several practical considerations.
3.5.1. Simulation. Any method for computing equilibrium prices under Mixed Logit mod-
els faces a common obstacle: the integrals that define the choice probabilities (P) and their
derivatives (Λ, Γ˜) cannot be computed exactly. We employ finite-sample versions of the
methods discussed below by drawing S ∈ N samples from the demographic distribution and
applying the method to the finite-sample model thus generated. Particularly, these samples
are used to compute approximate P(p), Λ(p), and Γ˜(p); see Table 5. These samples are
kept fixed for all steps of the method and, in principle, can be generated in any way. We
draw directly from the demographic distribution, although importance and quasi-random
sampling (e.g., see Train (2003)) can also be employed. The Law of Large Numbers mo-
tivates this widely-used approach to econometric analysis (e.g., see McFadden (1989) and
Draganska and Jain (2004)). While all numerical approaches for computing equilibrium
prices described here rely on a Law of Large Numbers for simultaneously stationary prices,
we do not provide a formal convergence theorem. We do provide numerical evidence that
computed equilibrium prices based on the fixed-point iteration for our examples do indeed
follow such a law.
3.5.2. Truncation of Low Purchase Probability Products. All of the methods we implement
can be built to ignore products with excessively low choice probabilities. That is, one
can ignore price updates for all products with Pj(p) ≤ εP , where εP is some small value
(say 10−10). Products with a choice probability this small (or smaller) need not be con-
sidered a part of the market in the price equilibrium computations. For example, Wards
(2007) reports total sales of cars and light trucks during 2005 as N = 16, 947, 754. Partic-
ularly, 7,667,066 cars and 9,280,688 light trucks. Because expected demand is defined by
E[Qj(p)] = NPj(p), any εP ≤ 0.5 ∗ N−1 ≈ 3 × 10−8 ignores any vehicle that, as priced,
is not expected to have a single customer out of the millions of customers that bought or
considered buying new vehicles. There are also technical reasons for this truncation. Par-
ticularly, Λ(p) and (D∇˜πˆ)(p) become singular as Pj(p)→ 0, for any j. Truncating avoids
this non-singularity and hopefully helps conditioning.
3.5.3. Termination Conditions. We terminate all iterations with the numerical simultane-
ous stationarity condition ||(∇˜πˆ)(p)||∞ ≤ εT where εT is some small number (e.g., 10−6).
Note that a standard application of Newton’s method to solve Fη(p) = 0 or Fζ(p) = 0
would terminate when either
(23) ||p− c− η(p)||∞ ≤ εT or ||p− c− ζ(p)||∞ ≤ εT ,
respectively. For example, Aguirregabiria and Vicentini (2006) use the condition ||p −
c − η(p)||∞ ≤ εT . Ensuring that Eqn. (23) holds does not necessarily imply that
||(∇˜πˆ)(p)||∞ ≤ εT , the strictly interpreted first-order condition.
Because
(D˜P)(p)⊤(p− c− η(p)) = (∇˜πˆ)(p) = Λ(p)(p− c− ζ(p)),
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it is easy to terminate all methods, CG-NM, η-NM, ζ-NM, and ζ-FPI, when ||(∇˜πˆ)(p)||∞ ≤
εT . While this is done here to ensure consistency in our comparisons of different meth-
ods, ||(∇˜πˆ)(p)||∞ ≤ εT should always be the termination condition for price equilibrium
computations.
Three other standard termination conditions are used (Brown and Saad, 1990; Dennis
and Schnabel, 1996). We terminate the iteration if the (relative) step length becomes too
small, if a maximum number of iterations is exceeded, or if an exceptional event occurs
(e.g. division by zero). These three conditions are considered “failure” as the iteration has
failed to compute a numerically simultaneously stationary point in the sense of the first
termination condition.
3.5.4. Second-Order Conditions. Each method in Table 4 finds simultaneously stationary
points, rather than local equilibria. Unlike in optimization, there is no a priori assurance
that first-order iterative methods for equilibrium problems will converge to certain types
of stationary points. Thus in computing equilibria it is vitally important to check the
second-order sufficient conditions to verify that a local equilibrium has indeed been found.
In local equilibrium every firm’s profit Hessian, (Df∇f πˆf )(p), should also be nega-
tive definite. The formulas given in Proposition 3.9 below provide an expression for
(Df∇f πˆf )(p) that we use to check the second-order sufficient condition. Cholesky fac-
torization, rather than direct approximation of the spectrum, is used to test the negative
definiteness of (Df∇f πˆf )(p) (Golub and Loan, 1996).
3.5.5. Computational Burden. Table 5 reviews the formulae and computational burden of
computing (∇˜πˆ), η, and ζ.
Computing η and applying Newton’s method to Fη requires solving linear systems. We
give some more details regarding these computations here. As stated above, the linear
system
(I− Ω˜(p))η(p) = −Λ(p)−1P(p)
should be used to solve for η(p). Note also that only the systems
(I−Ωf (p))ηf (p) = −Λf (p)−1Pf (p)
for all f need be solved. Of course, our condition bound applies within firms as well:
κ2
(
(DfPf )(p)
⊤
) ≥ (maxj∈Jf |λj(p)|
minj∈Jf |λj(p)|
)
κ2
(
I−Ωf (p)
)
.
If Householder QR factorization is used to solve these systems, then computing η(p) from
P(p), Λ(p), and Γ˜(p) requires O(∑Ff=1 J3f ) flops (Table 5).
This is a significant increase in computational effort relative to computing ζ(p) or
(∇˜πˆ)(p). The diagonal dominance of I − Ω˜(p), indeed of (D˜P)(p) itself, suggests that
Jacobi, Gauss-Seidel, and Successive Over-Relaxation (SOR) iterations (Golub and Loan,
1996) may be a relatively efficient way to compute η.
Additional work is required to compute (Dη)(p), if this is to be used in Newton’s method.
Though it requires solving a matrix-linear system of the type (D˜P)(p)(Dη)(p) = B(p),
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Table 5. Work required to evaluate (∇˜πˆ), η, and ζ given S sam-
ples {θs}Ss=1 ⊂ T , an S × J matrix L(p) of Logit choice probabilities
((L(p))s,j = P
L
j (θs,p)), and an S × J matrix of utility derivatives D(p)
((D(p))s,j = (Dwj)(θs, pj)). The first section gives work required for
sample-average approximations to P(p), Λ(p), and Γ˜(p). The second sec-
tion takes P(p), Λ(p), and Γ˜(p) as given.
Quantity Formula flops
P(p) S−1L(p)⊤1 SJ
V(p) L(p) ·D(p)(a) SJ
Λ(p) S−1V(p)⊤1 SJ
Γ˜(p) S−1L(p)⊤V(p) 2S
∑F
f=1 J
2
f
Total work to compute P(p), Λ(p), and Γ˜(p) S
(
3J + 2
∑F
f=1 J
2
f
)
ζ(p) Ω˜(p)(p − c)−Λ(p)−1P(p) 2∑Ff=1 J2f + 4J
η(p) (I− Ω˜(p))η(p) = −Λ(p)−1P(p) ( 43)∑Ff=1 J3f + ( 72) (∑Ff=1 J2f + J)− 2
(∇˜πˆ)(p) (Λ(p)− Γ˜(p)⊤)(p− c) +P(p) 2∑Ff=1 J2f + 5J
= Λ(p)(p− c− ζ(p)) 2∑Ff=1 J2f + 6J
(a) “·” here denotes element-by-element multiplication.
the required matrix factorizations of I − Ωf (p) need only be computed once to compute
both η and (Dη), but must be updated for each vector of prices.
3.6. Computing Jacobian Matrices for Newton’s Method. Standard “exact” or
Quasi-Newton methods to solve F(x) = 0 either always or periodically require the Jacobian
matrix (DF)(x). Using finite differences to approximate Jacobian matrices requires J
evaluations of the function F, an unacceptable workload. In the 993 vehicle example from
Morrow and Skerlos (2010), approximating (DF)(x) once with finite differences would take
roughly 993 evaluations of F, when the work of less than 50 evaluations appears to sufficient
to converge to equilibrium prices using the ζ-FPI.
We recommend directly approximating (DF)(x) using integral expressions for (D∇˜πˆ)(p),
(Dη)(p), and (Dζ)(p) provided below. An alternative is to use automatic differentiation,
but we are skeptical that this would in fact be faster than the direct formulae provided
here.
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3.6.1. Jacobian of the Combined Gradient. Assuming a second application of the Leibniz
Rule holds, we can derive integral expressions for the second derivatives (DlDkπˆf(k))(p)
through (
(D∇˜πˆ)(p))
k,l
= (DlDkπˆf(k))(p) =
∫
(DlDkπˆ
L
f(k))(θ,p)dµ(θ).
Proposition 3.9. Let w be twice continuously differentiable in p and suppose a second
application of the Leibniz Rule holds for the Mixed Logit choice probabilities at p. Set
φk,l(p) =
∫
(Dwk)(θ, pk)P
L
k (θ,p)P
L
l (θ,p)(Dwl)(θ, pl)dµ(θ)
ψk,l(p) =
∫
(Dwk)(θ, pk)P
L
k (θ,p)πˆ
L
f(k)(θ,p)P
L
l (θ,p)(Dwl)(θ, pl)dµ(θ)
χk(p) =
(
1
2
)∫ (
(D2wk)(θ, pk) + (Dwk)(θ, pk)
2
)
× PLk (θ,p)
(
(pk − ck)− πˆLf(k)(θ,p)
)
dµ(θ)
(i) Component form: Setting
ξk,l(p) = δk,l(λk(p) + χk(p))− γk,l(p)− (pk − ck)ϕk,l(p)
we have
(DlDkπˆf(k))(p) = ξk,l(p) + 2ψk,l(p) + δf(k),f(l)ξl,k(p)
(ii) Matrix form: Let Φ(p), Ψ(p) and X(p) = diag(χ(p)) be the matrices of these
quantities. Also set
Ξ(p) = Λ(p)− Γ(p)− diag(p− c)Φ(p) +X(p).
and
(Ξ˜(p))k,l =
{
ξk,l(p) if f(k) = f(l)
0 if f(k) 6= f(l)
Then
(24) (D∇˜πˆ)(p) = Ξ(p) + 2Ψ(p) + Ξ˜(p)⊤.
Proof. To see that this only relies on a second application of the Leibniz Rule to the choice
probabilities, note that
(DlDkπˆf(k))(p) =
∑
j∈Jf(k)
(DlDkPj)(p)(pj − cj) + δf(k),f(l)(DkPl)(p) + (DlPk)(p)
and thus the continuous second-order differentiability of πˆf (p) depends only on the second-
order continuous differentiability of Pf . This result is then an immediate consequence of
the validity of the Leibniz Rule, if a bit tedious to derive. 
The validity of a second application of the Leibniz Rule to the choice probabilities is
ensured by the following condition.
Proposition 3.10. Let (u, ϑ, µ) = (w + v, ϑ, µ) be such that
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(i) w(θ,y, ·) : (0, ς∗)→ R is twice continuously differentiable for all y ∈ Y and µ-a.e.
θ ∈ T
(ii) for all (y, p) ∈ Y× (0, ς∗),
∣∣(D2w)(·,y, q) + (Dw)(·,y, q)2∣∣ eu(·,y,q)−ϑ(·) : T → [0,∞)
is uniformly µ-integrable for all q in some neighborhood of p.
(iii) for all (y, p), (y′, p′) ∈ Y × (0, ς∗),
|(Dw)(·,y, q)| eu(·,y,q)−ϑ(·)eu(·,y′,q′)−ϑ(·) ∣∣(Dw)(·,y′, q′)∣∣ : T → [0,∞)
is uniformly µ-integrable for all (q, q′) in some neighborhood of (p, p′).
Then a second application of the Leibniz Rule holds for the Mixed Logit choice probabilities,
which are also continuously differentiable on (0, ς∗1).
This is proved in the same manner as Proposition 2.4.
We also observe the following.
Proposition 3.11. If Pk(p) = 0 then (DlDkπˆf(k))(p) = (DkDlπˆf(l))(p) = 0 for all l ∈
N(J).
The proof follows from the derivative formulae given above. Of course, if Pk(p) = 0 then
(Dkπˆf(k))(p) = 0 as well and we have the following situation: (i) the Newton system is
consistent for any sNk (p) ∈ R and (ii) sNl (p) does not depend on sNk (p) for all l ∈ N(J)\{k}.
Thus, in practice one can restrict attention to the Newton step defined by the submatrix
of (D∇˜πˆ)(p) formed by rows and columns indexed by {j : Pj(p) > εP }.
The formulae above give the following expression of the profit Hessians.
Corollary 3.12. Let w be twice continuously differentiable in p and suppose a second
application of the Leibniz Rule holds for the Mixed Logit choice probabilities. Firm f ’s
profit Hessian is given by
(Df∇f πˆf )(p) = Ξf,f (p) + 2Ψf,f (p) +Ξf,f (p)⊤.
3.6.2. The η map. For Fη(p) = p − c − η(p), we have (DFη)(p) = I − (Dη)(p) where
(Dη)(p) solves the linear matrix equation
(D˜P)(p)⊤(Dη)(p) = −(A(p) + (DP)(p)).
Here (A(p))k,l =
∑
j∈Jf(k)
(DlDkPj)(p)ηj(p). This is easily derived from the defining
formula (D˜P)(p)⊤η(p) = −P(p).
3.6.3. The ζ map. For Fζ(p) = p − c − ζ(p), we have (DFζ)(p) = I − (Dζ)(p) where
(Dζ)(p) can be computed using the following formula:
(Dlζk) = λ
−1
k
[
δk,l
[∫
PLk
(
(D2wk) + (Dwk)
2
) (
πˆLf(k) − ζk
)
− λk
]
+ ζkφk,l + γk,l + δf(k),f(l)φk,l(pl − cl) + δf(k),f(l)γl,k − 2ψk,l
]
.
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4. The GMRES-Newton Hookstep Method
In this section we provide some details regarding the GMRES-Newton Hookstep method
employed in Morrow and Skerlos (2010). For complete details, see ?.
4.1. Inexact NewtonMethods. A strong theory of “Inexact” Newton methods exists for
the solution of systems of nonlinear equations when there are “many” variables. Inexact
Newton steps are simply “inexact” solutions to the Newton system; that is, an inexact
Newton step sIN is any vector that satisfies
(25) ||F(x) + (DF)(x)sIN || ≤ δ||F(x)||
for some fixed δ ∈ (0, 1) (Dembo et al., 1982; Brown and Saad, 1990; Eisenstat and Walker,
1994, 1996; Pernice and Walker, 1998). The name “truncated” Newton method has also
been used for the specific case when the inexactness comes from the use of iterative linear
system solvers like GMRES (Saad and Schultz, 1986; Walker, 1988) or BiCGSTAB (van der
Vorst, 1992; Sleijpen and Fokkema, 1993). We focus on GMRES, a particularly simple yet
strong iterative method for general linear systems that has been consistently used in the
context of solving nonlinear systems (Brown and Saad, 1990).
By appropriately choosing a sequence of δ’s, the local asymptotic convergence rate of
an inexact Newton’s method can be fully quadratic (Dembo et al., 1982; Eisenstat and
Walker, 1994). Of course, taking δ → 0 to achieve the quadratic convergence rate will
also require increasingly burdensome computations of inexact Newton steps that satisfy
increasingly strict inexact Newton conditions. On the other hand, δ can be chosen to be
a constant if a linear locally asymptotic convergence rate is suitable (Pernice and Walker,
1998).
Generally speaking there are three reasons to adopt the inexact perspective. First, direct
methods like QR factorization may not be the most effective means to solve the Newton
system when this system is large, because of computational burden and accumulation of
roundoff errors. Instead, iterative solution methods are often used to solve linear systems
with many variables; see, e.g. Trefethen and Bau (1997). Second, iterative methods like
GMRES require only matrix-vector products (DF)(p)s that can be approximated with finite
directional derivatives (Brown and Saad, 1990; Pernice and Walker, 1998). Thus inexact
Newton’s methods can be “matrix-free”; see Section 4.3.4 below. Third, Newton steps
often point in inaccurate directions when far from a solution (Pernice and Walker, 1998).
Thus solving for exact Newton steps may involve wasted effort, especially when there are
many variables.
matlab’s fsolve function implements a related approach using the (preconditioned)
Conjugate Gradient (CG) method applied to the normal equation for the Newton system,
(DF)(p)⊤(DF)(p)sIN = −(DF)(p)⊤F(p). Use of the normal equations is required be-
cause CG is applicable only to symmetric systems (Trefethen and Bau, 1997). Note that
this requires that the Jacobian (DF) is explicitly available. Although this holds for price
equilibrium problems under Mixed Logit models, it can be a significant restriction for gen-
eral problems. By requiring products (DF)(p)⊤h in each step of the iterative linear solver,
this approach also increases the work by O(NJ2) flops where the solver takes N steps.
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Finally, this approach can also be less accurate: using the normal equation squares the
linear problem’s condition number, and thus risks serious degradation in solution quality
(Trefethen and Bau, 1997). Pernice and Walker (1998) describe a similar approach using
BiCGSTAB: the extension of CG to non-symmetric systems.
4.2. GMRES. The “Generalized Minimum Residuals” or GMRES method (Saad and Schultz,
1986) solves a linear system Ax = b by using the Arnoldi process to compute an orthonor-
mal basis of the successive Krylov subspaces K(n) and then takes approximate solutions
from those subspaces having least squares residuals. See Trefethen and Bau (1997) for a
good introduction to Krylov methods in general, including the Arnoldi process and GMRES.
In the nth stage, GMRES “factors” A as AQ(n) = Q(n+1)H˜(n) where Q(n) ∈ RN×n is an
orthonormal basis for K(n), Q(n+1) ∈ RN×(n+1) is an orthonormal basis for K(n+1) ⊃ K(n),
and H˜(n) ∈ R(n+1)×n is upper-Hessenberg. Any vector x ∈ K(n) ⊂ RN can be written
x = Q(n)y for some y ∈ Rn and thus the least-squares residual problem becomes
min
x∈K(n)
||As− b||2 = min
y∈Rn
||AQ(n)y − b||2 = min
y∈Rn
||H˜(n)y − (Q(n+1))⊤b||2.
The orthonormal basis is typically chosen so that (Q(n+1))⊤b = βe1 for some β ∈ R,
and hence the GMRES solution x(n) = Q(n)y where y solves minq∈Rn ||H˜(n)y − βe1||2. This
least squares problem can be solved using the QR factorization of H˜(n). Furthermore this
factorization can be efficiently updated in each iteration, instead of computed from scratch.
Moreover the actual solution vector need not be formed until the residual is suitably small.
4.2.1. Householder GMRES. We have implemented a variant of GMRES based on House-
holder transformations due to Walker (1988); this is also the version implemented in
matlab’s gmres code. We have verified that our implementation generates results matching
matlab’s implementation. In this version of the GMRES process applied to the generic prob-
lem Ax = b, Householder reflectors P(n) ∈ RN×N are used to generate the orthonormal
matrices
Q(n) = P(1) · · ·P(n)
[
I
0
]
∈ RN×n (I ∈ Rn×n, 0 ∈ R(N−n)×n)
satisfying
AQ(n) = P(1) · · ·P(n+1)H(n) = Q(n+1)H˜(n)
where H(n) ∈ RN×n is
H(n) =
[
H˜(n)
0
]
for upper Hessenberg H˜(n) ∈ R(n+1)×n and 0 ∈ R(N−n−1)×n. P(1) is chosen to satisfy
P(1)b = −βe1 where β = sign(b1)||b||2, and hence (Q(n))⊤b = −βe1. The nth approximate
solution x(n) is taken to be x(n) = Q(n)y(n) where y(n) ∈ Rn solves
min
y∈Rn
||H˜(n)y− βe1||2.
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Again these problems can be solved cheaply by updating QR factorizations with Givens
rotations. Neither the solution vector nor the residual vector be formed until GMRES con-
verges. An efficient implementation requires O(Jn) flops and a matrix multiply in the
nth iteration, so that taking N iterations requires O(JN2) of “overhead” in addition to
the O(NJ2) work required for the matrix multiplications (using the actual Jacobians). So
long as N < J , using GMRES with the actual Jacobians is cheaper than solving for the
actual Jacobian with QR. With small N , as we achieve using η and ζ, the savings is quite
substantial.
We note the following formulae specific to the Newton system case. For A = (DF)(x)
and b = −F(x), β = −sign(F1(x))||F(x)||2 and −βe1 = P(1)b = −P(1)F(x) so that
P(1)F(x) = βe1 = −sign(F1(x))||F(x)||2e1.
Moreover, P(n)e1 = e1 for all n > 1 so that
(Q(n))⊤F(x) = −sign(F1(x))||F(x)||2e1.
4.2.2. Preconditioning. As is well known, preconditioning is key to the effectiveness of
iterative linear solvers; see Golub and Loan (1996). We have not found the linear systems
in η-NM or ζ-NM to need preconditioning. However we have found the preconditioned
system
(26) Λ(p)−1(D∇˜πˆ)(p)sIN = −Λ(p)−1(∇˜πˆ)(p) = c+ ζ(p)− p
to be very necessary for rapid solution of the Newton system in CG-NM. This precondi-
tioner is motivated by the following relationship of the Jacobian of (∇˜πˆ) to the Jacobian
of ζ in equilibrium.
Lemma 4.1. I− (Dζ)(p) = Λ(p)−1(D∇˜πˆ)(p) for any simultaneously stationary p.
Proof. This follows from differentiating (∇˜πˆ)(p) = Λ(p)(p−c−ζ(p)) via the product rule,
recognizing that p− c− ζ(p) = 0 in equilibrium and D[p− c− ζ(p)] = I− (Dζ)(p). 
In other words, Newton’s methods applied to Fπ(p) preconditioned as above ends up
being essentially the same iteration as Fζ(p), close enough to equilibrium.
GMRES, if used successfully on this preconditioned system Eqn. (26), will ensure that
(27) ||Λ(p)−1(∇˜πˆ)(p) +Λ(p)−1(D∇˜πˆ)(p)sIN || ≤ δ′||Λ(p)−1(∇˜πˆ)(p)||
for some δ′. This is distinct from the inexact Newton condition Eqn. (25). The following
proposition gives modified tolerances for the preconditioned system to ensure satisfaction
of the original system.
Proposition 4.2. Let δ > 0 be given. If Eqn. (27) is satisfied with δ′(p, δ) ≤ δ given by
(28) δ′(p, δ) =
(
||(∇˜πˆ)(p)||2
maxj {|λj(p)|} ||Λ(p)−1(∇˜πˆ)(p)||2
)
δ,
then Eqn. (25) is satisfied.
This is a consequence of the following general result, which we state without proof.
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Lemma 4.3. Let b ∈ RN and A,M ∈ RN×N be nonsingular. Then
(29)
||Ax− b||
||b|| ≤ α
( ||M−1Ax−M−1b||
||M−1b||
)
where α ∈ [1, κ(M)] is given by
α =
||M||||M−1b||
||b|| = ||M||
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣M−1
(
b
||b||
)∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣ .
This implies that
||Ax− b||
||b|| ≤ δ if
||M−1Ax−M−1b||
||M−1b|| ≤
δ
α
.
Note that the preconditioned system must always be solved to a stricter tolerance than is
desired for the un-preconditioned system using this bound. Additionally, computing α for
a generic preconditioner M relies on the ability to compute ||M||.
Eqn. (28) simply adopts the 2-norm and applies the formula (Golub and Loan, 1996)
||Λ(p)||2 =
√
max
j
{|λj(p)|2} = max
j
{|λj(p)|}
Eqn. (29) also implies that if Eqn. (27) holds with δ′ > 0, then
||(∇˜πˆ)(p) + (D∇˜πˆ)(p)sIN ||2
||(∇˜πˆ)(p)||2
≤ κ2(Λ(p))δ′
where κ2(Λ(p)) = ||Λ(p)||2||Λ(p)−1||2 is the (2-norm) condition number of Λ(p). This
equation, while the more compact representation, can also be overly conservative as clearly
illustrated in Fig. 1. It is unlikely that κ(Λ(p)) is a tight upper bound on the multiplier
in Eqn. (28). In fact, the multiplier on δ depends only on the norm of Λ(p)−1x at a single
point on the surface of the unit sphere in RJ rather than ||Λ(p)−1||2, the maximum norm
of Λ(p)−1x over this entire sphere. Our examples in Fig. 1 bear this out, having condition
numbers many orders of magnitude larger than the multiplier in Eqn. (28).
The power of the preconditioning is that the preconditioned system Eqn. (27) appears
to be solved to a relative error of δ′(p, δ) much faster than the original system can be solved
to a relative error of δ, even though δ′(p, δ) ≤ δ. As can be seen in Fig. 1, solving the
preconditioned system to δ′(p, δ) can achieve a relative error in the original system below
δ = 10−10 in roughly four orders of magnitude fewer iterations than solving the original
system to this same relative error for prices near equilibrium. Away from equilibrium,
GMRES may not be able to solve the original system to small relative errors like 10−6 at all.
Thus using the original system would appear to slow, if not halt, an implementation of the
inexact Newton’s method.
4.3. The GMRES Hookstep. Suitable modifications of each of the globalization strategies
originally developed for “exact” Newton methods can be applied in the inexact context.
Brown and Saad (1990) directly extend line search and a dogleg steps to GMRES-Newton
methods. Eisenstat and Walker (1996) and Pernice and Walker (1998) apply a safeguarded
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Figure 1. Relative error in computed solutions to the CG-NM Newton
system and its preconditioned form using GMRES in the vehicle example from
Morrow and Skerlos (2010) using the Berry et al. (1995) model. On the top,
prices are p = p∗ + 100ν where p∗ are equilibrium prices and ν ∈ [−1,1]
is a sample from a uniformly distributed random vector. For this case
κ(Λ(p)) = 1.56 × 1011 while the multiplier in Eqn. (29) is only 106.41.
On the bottom, prices are p = 20, 000ν + 5, 000 where ν is a sample from
a random vector uniformly distributed on [0,1]. For this case κ(Λ(p)) =
4.6× 104 while the multiplier in Eqn. (29) is only 10.73. Abbreviations are
as follows. REL: relative error in the Newton System; PREL: relative error
in the pre-conditioned Newton System; OBREL: our bound, Eqn. (29), on
the relative error in the Newton System as determined from the relative
error in the preconditioned Newton system; CNBREL: condition number
bound on the relative error in the Newton System as determined from the
relative error in the preconditioned Newton system.
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backtracking line search to facilitate global convergence. More recently, Pawlowski et al.
(2006, 2008) have studied dogleg steps suitable for GMRES-Newton methods in some detail.
Finally Viswanath (2007) has derived an elegant version of the hookstep method suitable for
GMRES-Newton methods. In contrast with the hookstep approach for the “exact” Newton
method with Jacobian (DF)(p), Viswanath’s approach requires computing the SVD only
of a matrix whose size is determined by the number of iterations taken by GMRES. For
reasonable applications of GMRES, this can be far less than the size of (DF)(p) itself. For
the examples in Morrow and Skerlos (2010), the size difference is roughly two orders of
magnitude: the GMRES-Newton hookstep worked with roughly 10 × 10 instead of 1, 000 ×
1, 000 matrices. Thus, the GMRES-hookstep can accumulate a tremendous savings over an
exact-Newton implementation of the hookstep method. Again, each of these approaches
iterates until an acceptable step is found, and can, in principle, involve many additional
evaluations of F or fail to find an acceptable step altogether.
Here we describe an implementation of the Levenberg-Marquardt method or “hookstep”
(Dennis and Schnabel, 1996) suitable for GMRES as first suggested by Viswanath (2007).
See also Viswanath (2009); Viswanath and Cvitanovic (2009); Halcrow et al. (2009). First,
we recall the basic structure of model trust region methods; see (Dennis and Schnabel,
1996, Chapter 6, Section 4). We then adopt this structure to the case of Krylov subspace
methods, particularly GMRES. Again, see ? for a more detailed discussion of this method.
4.3.1. Model Trust Region Methods. Trust region methods assume that for steps s satisfying
||s||2 ≤ δ, the function
mˆx(s) =
(
1
2
)
||F(x)||22 + ((DF)(x)⊤F(x))⊤s+
(
1
2
)
s⊤(DF)(x)⊤(DF)(x)s
is an accurate local model of f(x) = ||F(x)||22/2 for suitably small steps. Note that mˆx is not
the usual, quadratic model of f derived from a Taylor series because (DF)(x)⊤(DF)(x) 6=
(D∇f)(x) (Dennis and Schnabel, 1996, pg. 149). The idea is to solve
(30) min
||s||2≤δ
mˆx(s).
The solution s∗ is given as follows: take s∗ = s
N = −(DF)(x)−1F(x) if ||sN ||2 ≤ δ; if
||sN ||2 > δ, take s∗ = s(µ∗) where
s(µ) = −((DF)(x)⊤(DF)(x) + µI)−1(DF)(x)⊤F(x)
and µ∗ > 0 is the unique µ > 0 such that ||s(µ)||2 = δ. These follow from the standard
optimality conditions, or rather that the gradient (∇mˆx)(s) must lie in the negative normal
cone to B¯δ(0) = {y ∈ RN : ||y||2 ≤ δ} at x (Clarke, 1975); see (Dennis and Schnabel, 1996,
Lemma 6.4.1, pg. 131).
Solving the problem above exactly generates the Levenberg-Marquardt method (Leven-
berg, 1944; Marquardt, 1963) or “hookstep.” By computing the SVD of (DF)(x) we can
easily solve for s(µ) when ||sN ||2 > δ (Dennis and Schnabel, 1996); see (Golub and Loan,
1996, Section 12.1, pgs. 580-583) for closely related results. Let (DF)(x) = UΣV⊤. We
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can then set s(µ) = Vr(µ) where
r(µ) = −(Σ2 + µI)−1ΣU⊤F(x).
A simple single-dimensional iteration can then be used to solve for the unique µ∗ such that
||s(µ∗)||2 = δ. ? derives two globally convergent methods for this task using Newton’s
method and a nonlinear local model (Dennis and Schnabel, 1996). The difficulty here is
computing the SVD of (DF)(x), requiring O(J3) flops (Golub and Loan, 1996, Chapter
5, pg. 254).
The step s∗ computed by either approach is acceptable if it generates sufficient decrease
in the squared 2-norm of F. Specifically, fix ρ ∈ (0, 1), α > 1, and β2 ≤ β1 < 1. If
||F(x)||22 − ||F(x+ s∗)||22 ≥ ρ(||(DF)(x)||22 − ||F(x) + (DF)(x)s∗||22)
then p← p+ s∗ and a the step length bound is expanded to [δ, αδ] for the next iteration.
Otherwise, δ is chosen from [β1δ, β2δ] and the corresponding s∗ is computed. While this
process of specifying an acceptable s∗ is iterative, much of the work required to build a trial
step does not need to be repeated. Specifically the SVD required for the hookstep does
not change (so long as it was computed in a previous iteration) while in the doglep step
the Newton and Cauchy steps remain the same. However every time the step size bound
is decreased F must be re-evaluated at the new trial step, with a computational burden
equivalent to taking a fixed-point step.
4.3.2. Model Trust Region Methods on a Subspace. AKrylov method for solving (DF)(x)sN =
−F(x) builds approximate solutions in the successive Krylov subspaces K(n). This has the
effect of further constraining the local model problem (30) to
(31) min
s∈K(n), ||s||2≤δ
mˆx(s).
For any Q ∈ RJ×n with orthonormal columns (generated by GMRES or not) we can set
mˆx,Q(y) = mˆx(Qy) and restrict attention to the trust region problem min||y||2≤δ mˆx,Q(y).
See (Brown and Saad, 1990, pgs. 149-150). The first-order conditions for this problem are
equivalent to either
(i) (∇mˆx,Q)(y) = 0 and ||y||2 ≤ δ
(ii) or (∇mˆx,Q)(y) + µy = 0 for ||y||2 = δ and some µ > 0.
By the definition of mˆx,Q, (i) implies
Q⊤(DF)(x)⊤(DF)(x)Qy +Q⊤(DF)(x)⊤F(x) = 0
and (ii) implies(
Q⊤(DF)(x)⊤(DF)(x)Q + µI
)
y +Q⊤(DF)(x)⊤F(x) = 0.
Note that these are square problems that can be solved exactly.
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4.3.3. The GMRES-Newton Hookstep. Using GMRES started at zero, (DF)(x)Q(n) = Q(n+1)H˜(n)
and (Q(n+1))⊤F(x) = −sign(F1(x))||F(x)||2e1. Thus we consider the family of n×n linear
systems
(Q(n))⊤(DF)(x)⊤(DF)(x)Q(n)q+ µq+ (Q(n))⊤(DF)(x)⊤F(x)
=
(
(H˜(n))⊤H˜(n) + µI
)
q− sign(F1(x))||F(x)||2(H˜(n))⊤e1 = 0
defined for all µ ≥ 0.
By computing the (“thin”) Singular Value Decomposition of H˜(n), H˜(n) = U˜ΣV⊤ where
U˜ ∈ R(n+1)×n, V ∈ Rn×n, and Σ ∈ Rn×n, we can easily solve each such problem. See
(Golub and Loan, 1996, Section 12.1, pgs. 580-583) for closely related results. Particularly,
((H˜(n))⊤H˜(n) + µI)q− sign(F1(x))||F(x)||2(H˜(n))⊤e1 = 0
is solved by q(µ) = Vr(µ) where
r(µ) = sign(F1(x))||F(x)||2(Σ2 + µI)−1ΣU˜⊤e1.
Because the diagonal elements of Σ2 are positive, r(µ) is well defined for all µ ≥ 0. Note
also that we only need the first row of U, but all of V, to compute q(µ).
In particular, q(0) = sign(F1(x))||F(x)||2VΣ−1U⊤e1. Invoking the full SVD of H˜(n),
H˜(n) =
[
U˜ un+1
] [Σ
0⊤
]
V⊤
for some un+1 ⊥ span{ui}ni=1, we can write
||H˜(n)q− sign(F1(x))||F(x)||2e1||2 =
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
[
Σ˜V⊤q
0
]
− sign(F1(x))||F(x)||2
[
U˜⊤e1
u1,n+1
]∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
2
.
We thus see that q(0) solves the (n+ 1)× n GMRES least squares problem
min
q
||H(n+1,n)q− sign(F1(x))||F(x)||2e1||2.
with residual |u1,n+1| ||F(x)||2. |u1,n+1| is unique: First, note that un+1 is a unit vector in
the span of a single vector, say v, that is orthogonal to the span of the columns of U˜. There
are only two unit vectors in this span, specifically ±v/||v||2, and thus un+1 ∈ {±v/||v||2}.
Thus |u1,n+1| ∈ |±v1/||v||2| = |v1| /||v||2.
It is also easy to see that
F(x)⊤(DF)(x)s(n)(µ) = F(x)⊤(DF)(x)Q(n)q(n)(µ)
=
((
Q(n+1)
)⊤
F(x)
)⊤
H˜(n)q(n)(µ)
= −β2
(
ν⊤1D(µ)ν1
)
= −||F(x)||22
(
ν⊤1D(µ)ν1
)
< 0
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where ν1 is the first row of U˜ and D(µ) = diag(d1(µ), . . . , dn(µ)) for di(µ) = σ
2
i /(σ
2
i + µ).
That is, the Householder GMRES-Newton Hookstep always lies in a descent direction for the
globalizing objective f(x) = ||F(x)||22/2.
4.3.4. Directional Finite Differences. Recall that one advantage to using an iterative solver
like GMRES to solve the Newton system is that only products of the type (DF)(p)s will be
required to solve the Newton system for F at p (Brown and Saad, 1990; Pernice and
Walker, 1998). Such products can be approximated by a single additional evaluation of F
in a “directional” finite difference (Brown and Saad, 1990; Pernice and Walker, 1998). For
example, the first-order formula
(DF)(x)s ≈ h−1(F(x+ hs)− F(x)),
requires only a single additional evaluation of F per (approximate) evaluation of (DF)(x)s.
Higher-order formulae requiring 2 and 4 additional evaluations of F are easy to derive; see
Pernice and Walker (1998). In their implementation of the GMRES method in the context
of an inexact Newton method, Pernice and Walker (1998) only use higher order finite-
differencing formulas at restarts. Brown and Saad (1990) provide a practical formula for
computing an appropriate value of h.
Since directional finite derivatives must be repeated at each step of iterative linear solvers,
each step of an iterative Newton system solver using directional finite differences could be
at least as expensive as a ζ-FPI step. That is, if an iterative solver should take 100 steps
to compute an inexact Newton step having small enough residual to satisfy the inexact
Newton condition, then we could have equivalently taken 100, 200, and 400 ζ-FPI steps
with the first, second, and fourth order formulae available in Pernice and Walker (1998).
In our examples, using GMRES regularly solves the η-NM and ζ-NM Newton systems in
approximately 10 steps. This implies that each η-NM and ζ-NM step is roughly equivalent
to 10 ζ-FPI steps.
In the Newton context, whether efficiency is ultimately gained by using directional finite
differences instead of computing the Jacobian matrices and using standard matrix-vector
products depends on the number of steps taken by the iterative linear solver. If GMRES
takes N ∈ N iterations to find an inexact Newton step for F, computing and using the
Jacobian requires O((S + N)J2) flops while using directional finite differences requires
O(SN∑Ff=1 J2f ) flops.
We have observed that for η-NM and ζ-NM, using the actual Jacobian takes roughly
half the computation time than using directional finite differences, even though GMRES
converges in very few iterations (N ∼ 10). Fig. 2 plots the sample trials for the Boyd
and Mellman (1980) model provided in Morrow and Skerlos (2010) using both analytical
Jacobians and directional finite differences. First note that the ζ-FPI regularly takes
about 1 s per iteration. For κ = 1 USD, the single-step convergence of the GMRES-Newton
Hookstep method translates into about 10 ζ-FPI steps, or about 10 s. Because GMRES
itself requires some small overhead (O(Jn) in the nth step), this is a somewhat reasonable
estimate of the work required. Two GMRES-Newton steps are required with κ = 10 USD
and we would expect about 20 s, a somewhat less sound estimate of the time required.
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Three GMRES-Newton steps are required with κ = 100 USD, leading us to expect about 20
s, a further less sound estimate of the time required. (These observations can be matched
with an asymptotic analysis of the work required.) Note also that the η-NM has the
greatest increase in time as a consequence of using the directional finite differences. This is
a consequence of having to repeat block QR factorizations when evaluating η at different
points, while evaluating (Dη) requires only a single factorization.
Fig. 3 plots the sample trials for the Berry et al. (1995) model provided in Morrow and
Skerlos (2010) using both analytical Jacobians and directional finite differences. Interest-
ingly, in this case use of the directional finite differences appears to generate a convergence
rate improvement. Otherwise, the story remains much the same as that discussed above
for the Boyd and Mellman (1980) model.
5. Other Methods
5.1. Variational Methods. Equilibrium problems are commonly formulated as varia-
tional inequalities or complementarity problems (Harker and Pang, 1990; Ferris and Pang,
1997). To be nontrivially distinct from nonlinear equations, such formulations require
restricting the variables to a proper, convex subset of RJ . When ς∗ < ∞ there is an
appropriate variational formulation of the equilibrium pricing problem:
(32) find p ∈ [0, ς∗]J such that (∇˜πˆ)(p)⊤(p− q) ≥ 0 for all q ∈ [0, ς∗]J .
5.1.1. The VI formulation is poorly posed. Unfortunately, the Variational Inequality (32)
is poorly posed when the derivatives of profit vanish as prices approach ς∗ <∞. There are
two specific issues with Eqn. (32) in this case. First, ς∗1 ∈ PJ is always a solution but never
an equilibrium when profits vanish as all prices approach ς∗; see Section ?? and Lemma 5.1.
Second, Eqn. (32) can be solved by any equilibrium of any differentiated product market
model constructed with a subset of the products offered (Prop. 5.2). Equilibria of such
“sub-problems” are not necessarily equilibria of the original problem, as demonstrated in
Example 8 below. This issue with Eqn. (32) is, in fact, equivalent to the problem with
CG-NM discussed in Section 3.2.
These issues imply that variational methods can compute many “spurious” solutions. If
an equilibrium problem and all its sub-problems have unique equilibria with all prices less
than ς∗, Eqn. (32) has 2
J solutions that might be recovered by a global method such as
PATH (Ralph, 1994; Dirkse and Ferris, 1995). However, only one of these solutions is an
equilibrium of the original problem, by assumption. A simple example demonstrates this
phenomenon.
Example 8. Consider a monopoly with two products produced at the same unit cost c.
Demand is given by a simple Logit model with product-specific utility functions uj(pj) =
α log(ς − pj) + vj for j ∈ {1, 2}, where ς ∈ (c,∞), v1, v2 ∈ R, and ϑ > −∞. The firm has
unique profit-maximizing prices (p∗1, p
∗
2). Furthermore p
∗
1, p
∗
2 < ς, and (p
∗
1, p
∗
2) is the unique
fixed-point of the map c+ ζ(·) on all of P2.
However the variational inequality formulation contains four distinct solutions, only one
of which is profit-maximizing. These four solutions are (p∗1, p
∗
2), (ς, ς), (q
∗
1, ς), and (ς, q
∗
2),
FIXED-POINT APPROACHES TO COMPUTING BERTRAND-NASH EQUILIBRIUM PRICES 45
100
10-2
10-4
10-6
10-8
Iterations (-)
1 USD
0 10 20 30
100
10-2
10-4
10-6
10-8
Iterations (-)
10 USD
0 10 20 30
100
10-2
10-4
10-6
10-8
Iterations (-)
100 USD
0 10 20 30
100
10-2
10-4
10-6
10-8
Iterations (-)
1000 USD
0 10 20 30 0 10 20 30 40 50
100
10-2
10-4
10-6
10-8
CPU Time (s)
1000 USD
0 10 20 30 40 50
100
10-2
10-4
10-6
10-8
CPU Time (s)
100 USD
0 10 20 30 40 50
100
10-2
10-4
10-6
10-8
CPU Time (s)
10 USD
0 10 20 30 40 50
100
10-2
10-4
10-6
10-8
CPU Time (s)
1 USD
ζ-FPI
η-NMζ-NM CG-NM
ζ-FPI
η-NMζ-NM
η-NM
ζ-NM CG-NM
ζ-FPI
η-NM
ζ-NM
CG-NM
ζ-FPI
η-NM
ζ-NMCG-NM
ζ-FPI
η-NM
ζ-NM
CG-NM
ζ-FPI
η-NM
ζ-NM
CG-NM
ζ-FPI
η-NM
ζ-NMCG-NMζ-FPI
Original FPI
Boyd & Mellman (1980) Boyd & Mellman (1980)
Figure 2. Typical convergence curves for perturbation trials under the
Boyd and Mellman (1980) model using both analytical and directional fi-
nite difference Jacobians. See also Fig. ??. Convergence curves for ana-
lytical Jacobian are drawn with solid lines, whereas convergence curves for
directional finite differences are drawn with dashed lines of the same color.
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Figure 3. Typical convergence curves for perturbation trials under the
Boyd and Mellman (1980) model using both analytical and directional fi-
nite difference Jacobians. See also Fig. ??. Convergence curves for ana-
lytical Jacobian are drawn with solid lines, whereas convergence curves for
directional finite differences are drawn with dashed lines of the same color.
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where q∗j < ς for j ∈ {1, 2} are the unique profit-maximizing prices that exist should the
firm offer only product 1 or 2. Only the first solution, (p∗1, p
∗
2), is profit-maximizing.
Proof. We complete the details of Example 8.
Consider a monopoly with two products produced at the same unit cost (c = c1 = c2 >
0), ϑ > −∞, and simple Logit model with utility
u1(p1) = α log(ς − p1) + v1 and u2(p2) = α log(ς − p2) + v2
for some fixed ς ∈ (c,∞), α > 1, and arbitrary v1, v2 ∈ R. Let p2 ≤ ς, and observe that
lim
p1↑ς
(
p1 − c− ζ1(p1, p2)
)
= ς − c− P2(ς, p2)(p2 − c) = (ς − c)
[
1− P2(ς, p2)
(
p2 − c
ς − c
)]
.
Since p2 ≤ ς and P2(p1, p2) < 1 for all p1, p2, we have limp1↑ς(p1− c− ζ1(p1, p2)) > 0. Thus
(D1πˆ)(p1, p2) < 0 for all p1 sufficiently close to ς. A similar argument can be made for
(D2πˆ)(p1, p2).
Note also that this proves that ς + ǫ > c+ ζ1(ς + ǫ, p2) for any ǫ ≥ 0 and p2, where ζ1 is
the extended map. A similar result holds for ζ2, instead of ζ1. Thus no (p1, p2) outside of
(0, ς) is fixed for the extended map c+ ζ(p).
We now prove that there exists a unique pair of profit-maximizing prices p∗ = (p∗1, p
∗
2) ∈
(0, ς)2. Since
lim
pj↑ς
(
pj − c− ζj(p1, p2)
)
<∞
for j ∈ {1, 2}, ζ = (ζ1, ζ2) is bounded and continuous on P2. By Brower’s fixed-point
theorem, there exists a stationary point p∗ = (p∗1, p
∗
2). Both prices must both be less than
ς, since profits decrease for all prices sufficiently close to ς. We now show that these prices
are also unique, borrowing a technique from Morrow and Skerlos (2008).
The first step is to prove that (D∇πˆ)(p∗) is negative definite at any stationary p∗. Note
that (D∇πˆ)(p∗) = Λ(p∗)(I − (Dζ)(p∗)); this relationship is valid for Mixed Logit models
with multiple firms as well. Furthermore ζj(p) = πˆ(p)− (Dwk)(pk)−1 for any simple Logit
model and any number of products. Hence
(Dkζj)(p) = (Dkπˆ)(p) + δj,k
(
(D2wk)(pk)
(Dwk)(pk)2
)
,
and I− (Dζ)(p∗) is a diagonal matrix with elements
1− (D
2wk)(pk)
(Dwk)(pk)2
.
In the case of this example,
1− (D
2w1)(p1)
(Dw1)(p1)2
= 1− (D
2w2)(p2)
(Dw2)(p2)2
= 1 +
1
α
> 0.
Thus (D∇πˆ)(p∗) is negative definite at any stationary point, and any stationary point
maximizes profits.
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The next step is to prove that the existence of only maximizers of profits proves that
there is a unique pair of profit-maximizing prices. Morrow and Skerlos (2008) accomplish
this with an application of the Poincare-Hopf theorem (Milnor, 1965), as follows. Consider
−πˆ(p). This function is minimized at any stationary p∗ = (p1, p2), and thus the gradient
vector field −(∇πˆ)(p) has index 1 at any stationary point p∗ (Milnor, 1965). Note also
that
sign{−(Dj πˆ)(p1, p2)} = sign
{
pj − c− πˆ(p1, p2)− ς − pj
α
}
for j ∈ {1, 2}. This equation shows that the gradient vector field −(∇πˆ)(p) points outward
on the boundary of the compact, convex set [c, ς]2, as can be checked. Thus the Poincare-
Hopf theorem states that the sum of the indices of the critical (stationary) points equals
one, the Euler characteristic of [c, ς]2. Since the index of any critical (stationary) point of
−(∇πˆ)(p) is one, there can only be one stationary point.
Using similar arguments, we see that the sub-problems formed by offering product 1 or
product 2 alone also have unique profit-maximizing prices q∗1 and q
∗
2, respectively. Because
v1 and v2 may be distinct, these prices need not be the same.
We have claimed that variational formulation of this problem has four solutions, only
one of which is an equilibrium. Indeed, these four solutions are (p∗1, p
∗
2), (q
∗
1, ς), (ς, q
∗
2),
and (ς, ς) but, as shown above, only (p∗1, p
∗
2) is an equilibrium. While this follows from
Props. 5.1 and 5.2 above, we prove it directly here. Of course, (p∗1, p
∗
2) is a solution since
(∇πˆ)(p∗1, p∗2) = (0, 0). Since
lim
pj↑ς
λj(p1, p2) = lim
pj↑ς
[(
ς − pj
α
)
Pj(p1, p2)
]
= 0
for j ∈ {1, 2}, limpj↑ς(Dj πˆ)(p1, p2) = 0 (i.e., Assumption 3.1 holds). Thus (∇πˆ)(ς, ς) =
(0, 0), and the variational inequality is satisfied at (ς, ς). Furthermore,
(D1πˆ)(ς, p2)(ς − q1) + (D2πˆ)(ς, p2)(p2 − q2) = (D2πˆ)(ς, p2)(p2 − q2)
and thus (ς, q∗2) is also a solution to the variational inequality. Similarly, (q
∗
1 , ς) is also a
solution. This completes the proof. 
Example 8 is easily generalized to include J > 2 products and a variational inequality
with 2J solutions. One of these solutions is the unique vector of profit-maximizing prices
for the original problem, one is ς1 ∈ PJ and is not profit-maximizing for any sub-problem,
and the rest are profit-maximizing for some sub-problem but not profit-maximizing for the
original problem.
This property of variational formulations is especially problematic since computations of
equilibrium prices must often be performed using models with ς∗ < ∞. Such models may
be derived from simulation-based approximations to Mixed Logit models with reservation
prices that are finite µ-a.e., as in the Berry et al. (1995) model of Example 2.
Fortunately methods based on the ζ map resolve only equilibria of the original problem.
In Section 5.1.3 we consider the important class of simulation-based approximations to
Mixed Logit models like those from Example 2 and prove that fixed-points of c + ζ(·)
FIXED-POINT APPROACHES TO COMPUTING BERTRAND-NASH EQUILIBRIUM PRICES 49
cannot be equilibria of a sub-problem that is not an equilibria of the original model. This
is essentially a consequence of Eqn. (21), which connects the sign of (Dkπˆf )(p) directly to
the sign of pk − ck − ζk(p).
Similar results may apply to the markup equation. However because Eqn. (20) involves
(D˜P)(p)⊤ instead of simply the diagonal matrix Λ(p), the relationship between the sign
of pk − ck − ηk(p) and the sign of (Dkπˆf )(p) is not clear.
5.1.2. General Results. We now prove the results stated above concerning a variational
formulation of the price equilibrium problem when ς∗ <∞.
Proposition 5.1. Suppose ς∗ < ∞ and Assumptions 2.1-3.1 hold. Then the variational
inequality (32) always contains ς∗1 ∈ PJ as a solution.
Proof. Since (∇˜πˆ)(ς∗1) = 0, Eqn. (32) is trivially satisfied. 
The following proposition states that this variational formulation is poorly posed in the
sense that it contains solutions to all sub-problems.
Proposition 5.2. Let ς∗ < ∞ and Assumptions 2.1-3.1 hold. Consider a proper subset
J ′ ⊂ N(J) of J ′ = |J ′| product indices, and any solution p∗J ′ = {p∗j : j ∈ J ′) to the
sub-variational inequality∑
j∈J ′
(Dj πˆf(j))(p
∗
J ′)(p
∗
j − qj) ≥ 0 for all qJ ′ = {qj : j ∈ J ′} ⊂ [0, ς∗]J
′
.
If we define p ∈ [0, ς∗]J by pj = p∗j for all j ∈ J ′ and pk = ς∗ for all k /∈ J ′ then p solves
the full variational inequality (32).
Proof. Because
(Dj πˆf(j))(p) =
{
(Dj πˆf(j))(p
∗
J ′) if j ∈ J ′
0 if j /∈ J ′
we have
J∑
j=1
(Dj πˆf(j))(p)(pj − qj) =
∑
j∈J ′
(Dj πˆf(j))(p
∗
J ′)(p
∗
j − qj) ≥ 0
for all q ∈ [0, ς∗]J . 
5.1.3. The Resolution of Equilibria with ζ. We have shown that variational formulations
of the equilibrium problem nest equilibria of all sub-problems, which may not be equilibria
of the original problem as Example 8. In this section we show that methods based on
the ζ map need not have this unfortunate shortcoming. This result strongly distinguishes
nonlinear system methods based on the ζ map from variational approaches.
We motivate this result with an example.
Example 9. Consider a finite-sample approximation to the Berry et al. (1995) model of
Example 2. That is, choose S ∈ N and draw {θs}Ss=1 where θs = (φs,βs, β0,s). These
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samples could be drawn via standard sampling from µ or from another technique like im-
portance or quasi-random sampling. In any case, suppose that the φ’s drawn are distinct
with probability one: φs 6= φr for all s, r ∈ N(S) with probability one. Without loss of
generality we take φ1 < φ2 < · · · < φS, and note that ς∗ = φS < ∞. If p = c + ζ(p)
and pk > ς∗, then firm f(k)’s profits increase with the price of the k
th product in some
neighborhood of ς∗.
Thus if we compute some fixed-point p = c+ζ(p) with pk > ς∗, we know that excluding
product k is profit-optimal for firm f(k). As shown in Example 8, this is not the case with
the VI formulation.
Proof. We will first define ζ on all of PJ , and then consider fixed-points p = c+ ζ(p) with
pk ≥ φS = ς∗.
To extend ζ, we define
ζk(p1, . . . , pk, . . . , pJ) = ζk(p1, . . . , ς∗, . . . , pJ) = lim
q→ς∗
ζk(p1, . . . , q, . . . , pJ).
when pk ≥ ς∗. Note that for all k and all p ∈ (0, ς∗)J we can write
ζk(p) =
∑
s:φs>pk

 ∑
j∈Jf(k)
PLj (θs,p)(pj − cj) +
φs − pk
α


(
PLk (θs,p)/(φs − pk)∑
r:φr>pk
PLk (θr,p)/(φr − pk)
)
We first define limpk↑φS ζk(p), we first note that for all pk ∈ (φS−1, φS) 6= {∅}, we have
ζk(p) =
∑
j∈Jf(k)
PLj (θS ,p)(pj − cj) +
φS − pk
α
since pk > φs for all s ∈ {1, . . . , S − 1}. Thus
lim
pk↑φS
ζk(p) =
∑
j∈Jf(k)\{k}
[
lim
pk↑φS
PLj (θS,p)
]
(pj − cj).
In other words, as pk approaches φS = ς∗, ζk approaches the profits firm f(k) accrues from
selling all products other than pk to the sampled individual with the highest income. This
establishes that the extended ζ is well-defined and continuous.
Now suppose pk = ck + ζk(p), where pk > φS = ς∗. Thus
0 = pk − ck − ζk(p) > φS − ck − ζk(p) = lim
qk↑φS
(
qk − ck − ζk(p1, . . . , qk, . . . , pJ)
)
,
and there must exist some δ > 0 such that
qk − ck − ζk(p1, . . . , qk, . . . , pJ) < 0
for all qk ∈ (ς∗ − δ, ς∗). Hence (Dkπˆf(k))(p1, . . . , qk, . . . , pJ) > 0
(Dkπˆf(k))(p1, . . . , qk, . . . , pJ) = λk(p1, . . . , qk, . . . , pJ)
(
qk − ck − ζk(p1, . . . , qk, . . . , pJ)
)
> 0.
In other words, if p = c+ζ(p) and pk > ς∗, then firm f(k)’s profits increase with the price
of the kth product in some neighborhood of ς∗. 
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Fortunately this example is fairly general. In the following proposition we prove that all
finite-sample simulators generate ζ maps that do not have equilibria of sub-problems as
fixed points unless they are, in fact, equilibria of the original problem. Three assumptions
are added: utilities must be twice continuously differentiable in prices, ς(θ) is finite µ-a.e.
as in the Berry et al. (1995) model, and the sampled values ς(θs) must be distinct with
probability one.
Proposition 5.3. Consider a Mixed Logit model satisfying Assumptions 2.1, 2.3, and 3.1
with wj(θ, ·) : (0, ς(θ))→ R twice continuously differentiable in price and ς : T → P finite
µ-a.e..
Generate a finite-sample simulator to this Mixed Logit model with {θs}Ss=1 for some
S ∈ N. Let ςs = ς(θs), and assume that ςs 6= ςr with probability one for any s 6= r.
Subsequently, order the samples so that ς1 < · · · < ςS = ς∗.
Suppose that p ∈ PJ satisfies p = c+ ζ(p) where ζ is the extended map as in Example
9. If pk ≥ ςS, then excluding product k is profit-optimal for firm f = f(k); particularly,
there exists δ > 0 such that
(Dkπˆf(k))(p1, . . . , pk, . . . , pJ) > 0
for all pk ∈ (ςS − δ, ςS).
Proof. The case pk > ςS is handled exactly as in Example 9. We must only consider the
case where
0 = ςS − ck − lim
pk↑ςS
ζk(p) = lim
pk↑ςS
[
pk − ck − ζk(p)
]
.
Our approach is to show that Dk[pk − ck − ζk(p)] > 0 for all pk near enough to ςS , and
thus
pk − ck − ζk(p) = pk − ck − ζk(p)−
[
ςS − ck − lim
pk↑ςS
ζk(p)
]
= −
∫ ςS
pk
Dk[pk − ck − ζk(p)]dpk < 0
(with a slight abuse of notation in the integral). More specifically, we prove that limpk↑ςS Dk[pk−
ck − ζk(p)] > 0, which implies that Dk[pk − ck − ζk(p)] > 0 for all pk near enough to ςS .
Because pk − ck − ζk(p) < 0 for pk near enough to ςS ,
(Dkπˆf(k))(p1, . . . , qk, . . . , pJ) = λk(p)
(
pk − ck − ζk(p)
)
> 0.
As in Example 9, note that for all pk ∈ (ςS−1, ςS) we have
ζk(p) =
∑
j∈Jf(k)
PLj (θS ,p)(pj − cj)−
1
(Dwk)(θS, pk)
since pk > ςs for all s ∈ {1, . . . , S − 1}. From this equation we derive
(Dkζk)(p) =
∑
j∈Jf(k)
(DkP
L
j )(θS,p)(pj − cj) + PLk (θS ,p) +
(D2wk)(θS, pk)
(Dwk)(θS , pk)2
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and thus
Dk
[
pk − ck − ζk(p)
]
= 1− (Dwk)(θS , pk)PLk (θS,p)
∑
j∈Jf(k)
PLj (θS ,p)(pj − cj)− PLk (θS ,p)−
(D2wk)(θS , pk)
(Dwk)(θS , pk)2
Now limpk↑ςS P
L
k (θS ,p) = 0, we have assumed that
lim
pk↑ςS
[
(Dwk)(θS, pk)P
L
k (θS ,p)
]
= 0
(Assumption 3.1), and
lim
pk↑ςS

 ∑
j∈Jf(k)
PLj (θS,p)(pj − cj)

 = ∑
j∈Jf(k)\{k}
lim
pk↑ςS
[
PLj (θS ,p)
]
(pj − cj) <∞,
we have
lim
pk↑ςS
Dk
[
pk − ck − ζk(p)
]
= 1− lim
pk↑ςS
[
(D2wk)(θS , pk)
(Dwk)(θS, pk)2
]
So long as
lim
pk↑ςS
[
(D2wk)(θS , pk)
(Dwk)(θS , pk)2
]
< 1
we have limpk↑ςS Dk
[
pk−ck−ζk(p)
]
> 0. This must be true, as Claim 1 below demonstrates.
This completes the proof. 
Claim 1. Let w : (0, ς)→ R be twice continuously differentiable, with (Dw)(p) < 0 for all
p ∈ (0, ς) and (Dw)(p) ↓ −∞ as p ↑ ς. Then
lim
p↑ς
[
(D2w)(p)
(Dw)(p)2
]
< 1.
Proof. Proof We prove this by contradiction. Note that
D
[
1
|(Dw)(p)|
]
=
(D2w)(p)
(Dw)(p)2
.
Now if
lim
p↑ςS
[
(D2w)(p)
(Dw)(p)2
]
≥ 1,
there must exist some p¯ ∈ (0, ς) such that
(D2w)(p)
(Dw)(p)2
> 0 for all p ∈ [p¯, ς).
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But then
0 ≤
∫ ς
p
(D2w)(q)
(Dw)(q)2
dq =
∫ ς
p
D
[
1
|(Dw)(q)|
]
dq = lim
q↑ς
[
1
|(Dw)(q)|
]
− 1|(Dw)(p)| = −
1
|(Dw)(p)| < 0,
a contradiction. 
5.2. Tatonnement. Some authors iterate best responses− i.e. tatonnement − to compute
equilibria. See, for example, Choi et al. (1990); CBO (2003); Michalek et al. (2004); Austin
and Dinan (2005); Bento et al. (2005); Hu and Ralph (2007). For this process Newton’s
method, or another algorithm of (unconstrained) optimization, will be required. Taton-
nement should be an efficient way to compute “equilibrium” if all firm’s profit-maximizing
prices are independent of their competitor’s decisions, but wasteful if some firm’s optimal
pricing depends heavily on their competitors’ prices. Furthermore no convergence guar-
antees exist for tatonnement while there are at least theoretical guarantees that Newton’s
method, properly constructed, will converge to simultaneously stationary prices.
5.3. Least-Squares Minimization and the Gauss-Newton Method. In principle
one could also use optimization methods to explicitly minimize f(p) = ||F(p)||22/2 for
any of our choices of F. In fact, line search and trust-region strategies for global con-
vergence implicitly minimize this function (Dennis and Schnabel, 1996). Computations
of equilibrium prices benefit from leaving this implicit, as explicit minimization via New-
ton’s method requires third-order derivatives of F, increasing both differentiability re-
quirements and computational burden. The Gauss-Newton method (Ortega and Rhein-
boldt, 1970) is obtained by neglecting the influence of the third-order derivatives of F.
This defines the Gauss-Newton step as a solution to the (symmetric) normal equation
(DF)(p)⊤(DF)(p)s = −(DF)(p)⊤F(p); note that the same problem arises should one wish
to use the Conjugate Gradient method to solve the Newton system. So long as (DF)(p) is
nonsingular the standard Newton steps will be recovered from the Gauss-Newton method.
However they are explicitly formulated as solutions to linear systems that are more poorly
conditioned (Golub and Loan, 1996; Trefethen and Bau, 1997) and thus we should at least
expect to accumulate more error in the process of solving for the same steps. The bur-
den of computing these steps also increases because of the requirement to multiply by the
transpose of the Jacobian of F.
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